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INTRODUCTION
The following is an exposition of Edward. Feit's
ai tide; in '’/ Grid. Politic s (January, 1968) dealing with
military coups in Ghana and Nigeria. I propose to test
this thesis by relating it to Uganda,
With virtually no difficulty small armies in Africa
have been able to set aside regimes because the regimes
had little or no substance to them.
As Zolberg (American Political Science Review, March,
1969) said, "The most salient characteristic of political
life in Africa is that it constitutes an almost institution-
less arena with conflict and disorder as its most prominent
features," There is much in Zolberg' s statement that reflects
the situation in Uganda,
The outstanding institutions of Africa are the tribes
and the administrative bureaucracy introduced by the colonial
powers
,
Tribal rulers and colonial magistrates each had a
desire for order and stability. Though for different reasons,
a cooperation developed that benefited both. Tribal rulers
could become more powerful in the tribes since the colonial
power guaranteed separation and thereby peace among the
tribes. If the tribal ruler did what he was told by the
magistrate, he had little fear of losing his position. Since
the colonial magistrate had little manpower he left the local
administration in the hands of the tribal ruler who had little
li
concern for other than local administration. Therefore, they
helped to make each other legitimate: the colonial magistrate
protected the tribal-traditional system agaisnt change and
the tribal-traditional rulers helped make colonial rule di-
gestable to their subjects.
It was the colonials who brought into existence the very
classes that challenged this rule by encouraging Africans to
leave the traditional setting for jobs in the factories and
the bureaucracy
. It is these classes who were neither Eur-
opean in outlook nor strictly traditional in setting that
were to become the new political entrepreneurs held in power
by political machines that maintained power by bribery and
rewards
.
Another very important factor is that after World War II
the colonial powers left Africa little by little; this creat-
ed a power vacuum in the traditional-administrative balance
that once existed.
Now to the point as to why armies succeed with little
effort. The army is the only "well organized and coherent
arm of government".
It is the purpose of this paper to see if the above
model holds true in Uganda. The present ruler Idi Amin
seized power in January 1971 » while the former ruler Milton
Obote was out of the country. There was little bloodshed.
The army under the command of Amin staged a coup because it
felt itself to be threatened by Obote *s dependence on the
iii
police for support and his creation of a"special forces” unit.
The army therefore, felt that its very existence was at
stake and so took the initiative since there was no other e-
ffective power to challenge it.
The most prominent element of Idi Amin Dada's regime is
that he wants to stay in power. However, since taking power,
Amin has clashed openly with almost all the groups which helped
him in his coup in 1971; among the key tribal groups of the
West Nile district, only his own tribe, the Kakwa, remain
"relatively loyal.”
Amin will stay in power as long as he has the support of
"his favored Malire mechanized regiment, the unit that con-
trols all tanks and armour in the capital." However, the
lattest attempted coup (March 197*0 involved dissident sec-
tions of the Malire regiment as well as other army units.
Members of the Lugbara tribe as well as a number of Christian
officers tried to overthrow him. The Christians were resent-
ful of the fact that Amin placed the positions of power in the
army, and the administration in the hands of the Muslims,
The Muslims total 10 percent of the population as opposed to
50 percent for the Christians. Also, the former Colonel Ga-
thafi of Libya, had recently visited Uganda and "made a
series of anti-Christian remarks."
The leader of the attempted coup was a Christian and a
Kakwa, the former army chief of staff Brigadier Charles Arube.
The strongest group was the Lugbara, about 2,000 army
iv
troops. Amin, it appears, had expected this challenge to his
authority for he had already removed the respected Lugbara
officer, Lt
.
Col. Obitre-Gama. On the Thursday preceeding the
attempted coup, Amin put on "old coup" commander, Major Juma
in command of the Malire regiment; the Lugbara commander was
sent on leave.
This move evidently forced the issue. Apparently there
was a "plan to assassinate Amin on Saturday night," the 24th
of March, but it misfired because he was not where he was
supposed to be.
The rebels didn't have a chance as they were out-manned
and out -gunned. A purge followed but many escaped; their ral-
lying point could be Lt. Col. Obitre-Gama who is at his home
in the West Nile district surrounded by a heavy bodyguard.
A few words about the paper is in order. This paper
treats events as they occurred in chronological order. It is
believed that this is the best method for developing the major
themes of this paper which are: ethnic conflict, lack of an
institution of comparable strength to the army, political in-
stability due in large measure to British colonial policies
and to their pull-out, and last the inherent weaknesses within
the army itself.
CHAPTER I
UGANDA: PHYSICAL HISTORY
Since the overthrow of traditional authority in 1966,
Uganda's political system has been based on and maintained by
military and police forces.
"Uganda is a political creature of nineteenth century
British imperialism and colonialism." 1 In the latter part of
the nineteenth century the Buganda kingdom was being torn apart
by civil war between Muslims and Christians; however political
authority survived because of the recuitment of Nubian mer-
cenaries left unemployed by the collapse of the Egyptian empire
in what today is the southern Sudan. (It is often said that
history repeats itself, as the Muslims and Christians in
Uganda today appear to be in conflict with each other. Also
there is a large contingent of Nubian mercenary soldiers in
the army under Amin's command.) A protectorate over the
Buganda kingdom was formally and peacefully established in
189^ and was extended over most of the country two years later.
Before effective British influence began in the 1890’s, 'Uganda'
meant Buganda kingdom, 'Uganda' being the word for Buganda in
Kiswahili
.
2
"Most Westerners and many Africans continue to interpret
political events, particularly conflicts between different
groups in an African state, in terms of 'tribalism' and 'tribal'
hatred . It is less misleading to speak of the area and the
relationship of these to the traditional and modern political
structures
.
2Uganda has a total land area of approximately 93,981
square miles of which 16,364 square miles are lakes, rivers,
streams, and swamp. For the most part, soil and climatic
conditions are excellent. Throughout the country only 22 per-
cent of the land recieves under 30 inches of rainfall per year,
the minimum required for agricultural productivity, while 72
percent of the country recieves from 30 to 50 inches a year.
Whereas the other 6 percent gets more than 50 percent in an
average year.
Climatic variations divide the country. The southern
part of Uganda has two rainy seasons, one peaking in spring
and the other in fall. Two relatively short dry spells occur
in early summer and early winter. In the north, the two peaks
of rainfall merge into one rainy season from spring to fall;
there is therefore a very long dry season from November to
March. It is because of this long dry season that the north
is limited to annual while the south produces perennial and
annual crops.
The difference between the abundance of agriculture on the
Victoria Lake "shore areas and the low productivity of the
4
north is related to soils as well as to rainfall patterns."
Ironstone is found in all types of soil in the country; this
loosely packed gravel lies from one inch to a yard under the
soil and because of its adhesive quality helps to prevent soil
erosion. In general the land of the north appears to have less
ironstone in its soil than does most of the south. Also, since
the land is mostly a plateau, erosion from runoff is at a min-
3imum but again there would appear to be more erosion in the
north because of the movement of the rivers to the north which
run off the plateau.
Agriculture is the source of livelihood for approximately
90 percent of the population.
.
,"
5 Almost everyone grows
their own food and food for sale. About "55 percent of the
gross domestic product" is contributed by commercial agricul-
ture, Agriculture contributed still more to the gross national
product because industry is concerned with the processing of
agricultural produce. Another important factor is that agri-
cultural products account for approximately 90 percent of
foreign exchange.
The most important cash crops are coffee and cotton of
which coffee in "the mid-1960's" contributed about 50 percent
of all the foreign exchange and cotton about 25 percent. Ugan-
da's dependence on only two crops for its major source of for-
eign exchange represents a weakness of which the former ruler of
Uganda, Mr. Obote, tried to correct by increasing the role of
sugar, tea, and tobacco as cash crops.
Uganda is one of the largest coffee exporting nations in
the world. There are two types of coffee grown in Uganda:
robusta, of low quality and used for instant coffee, and ara-
bica, of high quality. The latter gets a good price on the
international market. But as late as the mid-1960's agricultural
production was mainly of robusta coffee, approximately 715 » 000
acres. It is mostly cultivated in plots of one acre; "standards
zr
of cultivation are generally low." Consequently, the country
4produces large amounts of low-quality robusta coffee. Since
there is a constant surplus of this coffee on the international
market, the quantity that the country can export is limited by
world agreements.
As the price of coffee began to fall in the mid-1960's,
Mr. Obote paid producers a price for their coffee that was
higher than the world price, thereby stablizing the producers
income and keeping them content for the moment. Although prices
continued to fall in the 1960's the producers were still sub-
sidized above world prices so that the government provided them
with little incentive to switch to other crops. The world
market price for the arabica coffee is higher but as of 1966
only 15,000 acres of it were planted.
"Since cotton is the most widely cultivated cash crop, it
represents an ideal crop with which to spearhead the effort
7to raise cash incomes." The government of Obote has been try-
ing to increase cotton production because of its high price on
the international market. There are over a million acres of
land producing cotton. Over 60 percent "of all farm holders
in the country" grow cotton. Most of the cotton along with a
food crop is grown in the south; little more than 25 percent
was planted in the north as of the late 1960's.
The quality of cotton is generally high. The cotton pro-
ducing areas are divided into zones in which each farmer is
free, improved seeds. This helps preserve the high quality
pure strains and by the rotations of strains helps prevent
disease
.
5However since output per acre is low, the government of
Obote had sought to increase productivity by the use of pest
controls, fertilizers, and improved cultivation techniques.
Particular importance has been attached to spraying with DDT
which can raise seed cotton yields by 250 to 480 pounds per
acre and the use of fertilizers which can raise the yields by
o
over 200 pounds per acre."
Farmers sell the cotton at a fixed price given to them by
the government in "advance of the buying season." Until 1966
these prices were above the world market prices but by the end
of the 1966 season the Cotton Price Assistance Fund of the
government reduced prices until they were more in line with the
international market. By 1968 the cotton growers were faced
with a considerable lower income.
As shall be seen later, the drop in the prices of coffee
and cotton led eventually to Mr. Obote' s downfall. The drop
in prices was one among many causes for his fall from power.
Mineral exploration has been going on in Uganda since 1919*
but not until the past ten years has it been done on a large
scale effort. The production of copper is the chief mineral
mined; all copper is obtained from one mine at Kilembe. Al-
though copper was discovered in 1906, it was not until the late
1950's that "mining operations were fully developed. . .when
t 9
the railway extension to Kasese, near the mine, was completed."
The country is also a source of beryllium ore, which is
useful as an alloy with copper and other metals and more im-
portant is useful as a "provider of nuclear energy.”
10
Because of its large deposits, Uganda could become an important
6exporter of beryllium.
Industrial minerals and non-metallic minerals are avail-
able also. Sand, used for building, and concrete are near the
shores of larger lakes. However they have to be transported
many miles to construction sites. Stones, such as granite and
quartzite, suitable for crushing are present throughout most
of the country.
Much money has been spent searching for oil, "so vital
to an inland country, However neither oil nor any workable
coal mines have been tapped. Surface indications of oil and
gas exist at the "western rift valley," pointing to the possi-
bility of a quantity for economic profit. As of this moment
nothing has been done to exploit this.
The chief towns in Uganda are near Lake Victoria which is
12
"the second largest lake in the world." Kampala which achieved
city status in 1962 is not only the capital and the largest
town, but it is also the most important educational, medical,
missionary, and commercial center of the country. "Kampala is
a vernacular name meaning the Hill of the Impala (a type of
antelope ). The gradual improvement in communications and
the introduction of coffee as a cash crop insured the early
commercial development of the city. Kampala is also an artis-
tic and cultural center with Makerere College on its periphery.
The major roads lead into Kampala.
Unlike Kampala which was an important governmental center
when the British came in the latter part of the nineteenth
century, the towns of Entebbe an Jinja are twentieth century
7creations. Entebbe was the British administrative center until
1958 when it was transferred to Kampala. Uganda’s international
airport is at Entebbe. There is virtually no industry; in
the surrounding districts coffee and cotton are the chief crops.
Jinja was the site of the first railroad line built in
Uganda. The Owen Falls hydroelectric power station, started
in 1957. has much to do with the development of Jinja. It is
a center with many industries i.e, a tobacco factory, East
Africa’s first steel rolling mill, and the Kilembe copper smel-
ter.
The population of Uganda is estimated to be approximately
9 million. Of this about one percent is composed of Indian,
Pakistani, European, and Arab settlers. The remainder of the
population is African. A large number of the non-Africans are
Ugandan citizens who were either born there or "acquired
citizenship." "Most Europeans and an estimated 30*000 of the
Indo-Pakistanis
,
however, carry passports until a law was pass-
ed in 1968 restricting their entry.
Most Ugandans live in the southern section of the country.
Rainfall and soil fertility have affected the distributions
of the population. Over 90 percent of the population live in
rural areas while the rest are urban dwellers.
With the introduction of cash crops and the development
of urban areas in the south, labor migration became an impor-
tant factor in Uganda. As a result of social and political
upheaval in Sudan, Congo, Rwanda, and Burundi, many have
Immigrated as laborers to Uganda with the prospects of v^age
8labor very high. Their presence has caused security problems
along with the difficult task of introducing agriculture to a
pastoral people. "The grouping together of persons who share
no kinship ties creates tensions among those who have been ac-
customed to life in a cohesive group.
The majority of the population in the south live near the
Lake Victoria area, the western slopes of Mount Elgon, Kigezi
District in the southwest, and the lower slopes of the Ruwen-
zoni Mountains on the Congo border; the only region of high
density in the north is the West Nile area.
Towns are a relatively new development in Uganda; the lar-
gest urban centers are Kampala and Jinja. Governmental ac-
tivities and the enterprises of non-Africans in commerce and
industry are responsible for the existance of urban centers.
'•The majority of non-Africans, 72 percent, live in urban areas,
whereas only about 3.8 percent of the Africans do. Urban-dwel-
ling Africans, however, total three times the non-African
urban populat i on . "
^
9CHAPTER II
ETHNIC GROUPS
As Berge said, "Ethnic pluralism is in Africa to stay." 17
The following is a case in point .
The Bantu people account for two-thirds of the population
of Uganda, including the largest tribe, the Ganda which account
for more than 15 percent of the population-. They live near
the northwest of Lake Victoria from which they grow cash crops
such as cotton and coffee, as well as their subsistence food
crops such as bananas .
Since most of the labor for the subsistence food crops
was done by women, this gave men time to raise large armies
and to participate in political life. This no doubt contribut-
ed largely to the "centralized political organization" in Bu-
ganda
.
To the east of the Ganda are the Soga who number more than
a half of million and who speak Luganda as well as Lusoga .
The next largest tribe of the Eastern Lacustrine Bantu is the
Gisu who number "about 330,000* "
The Western Lacustrine Bantu include the Nkole, the third
largest tribe, more than "500,000; the Toro, 208,000; the
Nyoro
,
188,000; the Kiga, 460,000; the Konjo, 107,000; and the
Amba, 35,000. " l8
Agriculture is the primary means of livelihood among the
Bantu-speaking people.
The Western Nilotic speaking people include the Lango,
about 400,000; the Acholi, about 300,000; the Alur,
about 130,00
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the Padhola, about 110,000; the Kuman, about 70,000; the Jonam,
about 30,000; the Kakwa, a small tribe in the north of Uganda
and the southern part of the Sudan; and the Paluo who are in-
dwled in the Nyoro estimate. Together these people account
for approximately 15 percent of the African Ugandan population.
The tribes together are called the Luo.
Although agriculture plays an Important role in their
economy, these people are primarily stock raisers. Cattle are
an important element in their social system for "relations be-
tween individuals are often based on the exchange of livestock." 1 ^
They live in small separated homesteads of "patrillneally re-
lated kin. " As a result of the pattern of shifting cultivation,
the place of a homestead is changed every three or four years.
The Eastern Nilotic speaking people include the Karamo-
jong, Dodoph, and the Jie, all number a little better than
100,000; the Teso, about 550 , 000; and some small tribes. These
people account for approximately 12 percent of the population.
The Karamojong Cluster (Karamojong, Dodoth, Jie, and the Turk-
ana of western Kenya) are stock-raisers . Cattle are valued
for social and economic purposes i.e. they play a part in
marriages, kinship relations, religious ritual, and the settle-
ment of legal disputes . Since they are necessary for social
esteem, people are strongly motivated to having large herds .
Cattle are rarely killed for meat—only on special occasions
or famine . Intertribal cattle raiding is an essential aspect
of their cultural heritage; the government has deployed "se-
curity forces" to control the raids. Young men and boys keep
11
the herds in the pasture land while most of the men, women,
and children remain in "stockaded homesteads in permanently
settled areas" near the center of the tribal territory.
Ihis is in contrast to the Teso who took to cash crop farm-
ing (cotton) in 1912.
In Uganda the Central Sudanic speaking people are
found in Lugbara and Madi of the West Nile District. There
are approximately 250,000 Lugbara, and 85,000 Madi; they
account for about 6 percent of the population. "The Lugbara
are stockraising agriculturalists, the Madi predominatly
poagn cul turali s ts . "
Intertribal relations vary. For example, Ganda and
Soga are culturally and linguistically similar and therefore
get along with each other. But tribes of the north are
isolated; because they have little contact with outsiders,
they tend to be suspicious and distrustful of strangers.
Traditionally pastoralists "do not get along" with
agriculturalists and tribes whose language is untelligible
to the other tend to be bitter to each other.
The Asians (Indian and Pakistani) numbered "about
90,000" until President/General Idi Amin Dada forced them
to leave Uganda. They as most non-Africans reside in the
urban areas. During British rule in Uganda the Europeans
were in the highest social positions, the Asians in the
middle, and the Africans at the bottom. Because of their
economic position the Asians and the Europeans stood out from
the majority of the Africans.
12
The Asians do not form a cohesive community; language,
religion, and place of origin are a strong incentive for
members to stay in their own group. They marry within their
own group and have clothing unique to each group. The ma-
jority are Hindus but the Sikhs and Ismaili Muslims are in-
fluential groups also. "Gujarati or Punjabi dialects are
spoken as the mother tongue by most." 21
The Goans account for 4 percent of the Asians; they are
Catholics and Western in dress and outlook. They speak
Konkani, Portuguese and English and "many have responsible
positions in the government."
It is characteristic of the Asian groups to organize
their own schools and hospitals and in general provide for
their own people. The Asian traders and artisans helped to
stimulate the importation of consumer goods in Uganda i.e.
the print cloth for garments. They also provide much of
the private capital for Uganda’s expanding industries.
Anti-Asian feelings are strong in Uganda. Because
many of the Asians occupy "middle man positions in the
economy, such as shopkeepers," the "Africans resent what
they regard as an Asian monopoly of commerce and small bus-
iness." 22 Africans distrust the Asians also because they
are believed to be "clannish" and hard "to get along with."
The reason for the African belief is that the Asians have
kept to themselves and therefore have not become intergraded
into the African community.
Even with the threat that many Asians may loose their
jobs to make way for the African population, many have
13
no 1 left the country as they regard it as their own coun-
try. More than 50 percent of them were born there, in
the 1950’s three- fourths of the Asians were recognized as
British subjects, the rest as British protected persons.
On the eve of independence "about 30,000 Asians applied
for Ugandan citizenship" but as late as 1968 more than
half of the applications were still pending action. it
is clear that the status of the non-citizen Asians as of
the late 1960’s was very dubious to say the least. They
were allowed to stay only if they filed "residents permits"
and if they were not kept in proper order, then expulsion
from the country would be the outcome. About 200 Asians
holding "Indian and British passports" were forced to leave
Uganda in March, 1968. (The plight of the Asians in the
regime of Idi Amin to be dealt with later.)
CHAPTER III
SOCIETY: ITS CONSTITUENT PARTS
14
There are about 40 African tribes grouped by language
into four categories i.e. the Bantu, Eastern Nilotic,
Western Nilotic, and the Central Sudanies. The more num-
erous Bantu-speaking people are found in the southern part
of Uganda. The Nilo ti c-speaking people live north of Lake
Kyoga and the Central Sudanic-speaking people live in the
West Nile District.
Most Europeans hold technical and governmental posi-
tions in the urban areas as well as Indian and Pakistanis
who are involved in business and commerce. "Since indepen-
dence many Africans have taken over jobs formally held by
I ndo -Pakistanis and Europeans, particularly those held by
23
noncitizens."
The Africans of Uganda live in "scattered homesteads."
Only some of the Nilotic people of the north live close to-
gether as it was used as a defense against raiding tribes.
The dominant social cohesive elements are family and
kinship. It is within this matrix that "most economic and
social activities take place." The clan is very important
because it has a choice in the "marriage partner" in that
intra-marriage within the clan is forbidden. The clan may
also set the terms for the inheritance of land and other
property as well as enforce "local customs and laws.
Traditionally, the tribes were ruled by chiefs, "each
15
under the authority of the head of a particular founding
clan made up of localized descent groups called lineages.
"
2 ^
The national unitary state of the former President, Mr.
Obote and the present ruler Idi Amin have shaken the tra-
ditional system through accommodation and adaptation to the
central government has remained.
Members of a tribe who speak the same language,
(.broad dialect differences exist even within the larger
tribes) which is generally uni telligible to other tribes,
there is no language that all Uganda's understand. Luganda
is spoken over a wide area in the southern part of the coun-
try and "Swahili, the trade language of much of East Africa,"
is spoken in the Lango
,
Acholi, and the Teso districts.
By 1968 a majority of "African language newspapers" were
written in Luganda.
English is the official language but by the late 1960's
and early 1970 's there were objections to this colonial in-
heritance. Also English "is associated with the educated
political elite, who had the opportunity to attend schools
2 5
and learn the language." And as former President Obote
pointed out in 1967, it was not likely that even 50 percent
of the population would have learned the official language
within the next 15 years.
Since Swahili is the second language of the areas
from which many of the Army recruits come, and since Army
personnel have served in other parts oi East Africa, where
16
Swahili is "the o fficial language for use in the Army, if is
used in the Ugandan Army. As of 1968 it was being taught
in many schools and was being considered for use as the
official language. Obote thought that Swahili could be
"more useful for communication between tribes" than any
tribal language and at the same time could serve as a
common tongue in East Africa. There was however much op-
position to this, especially from the Luganda speaking
people in the southern part cf Uganda.
Cultural diversity in Uganda is the product of different
historic backgrounds. The Bantu-speakers came to southern
Uganda "about 2,000 years ago" while the Milo tic-speakers
came to northern Uganda "between A.D. 1,000 to 1,500."
Sometime in the 16,00* s the Nilo tic-speakers spread out to
most parts of Uganda. It is believed that their movement
south forced the Bantu speakers to consolidate themselves in-
to "centralized kingdom-states" for protection.
The Central Sudanic speaking people have been in the
West Nile District for centuries. They are culturally link-
ed to the southern Sudan and northeast Congo (Kinshasa)
people.
in Uganda there are as many different tribes as there
are languages, so that a tribe can be defined by its language.
Also "dress and body adornment" are useful as a means of
distinguishing one tribe from the other.
There is also physical diversity among the Ugandans.
Eor example, the tribes of the southwest are generally
17
short and roundheaded while the Uilatic speakers of the north
are tall and longheaded. The Central Sudanic and Bantu
people are stouter generally and shorter than the Nilatic
peopl e
.
The Ugandan society patterns itself according to the
institutions of the "rural majority and the urban minority."
By the use of "modern institutions such as centralized
government, education, health services, and the monetary
economy, a national social structure is gradually being
2 6formed." The highest social positions are based upon eco-
nomic achievement, family position, and educational level.
Although social status is recognized, social classes as we
know them in the United States do not exist.
The occupation of virtually all the rural people is
farming. The status, authority, and wealth of an individual
is based primarily on age, experience, and membership in a
"recognized family." The rural residents are generally all
members of the same tribe. In contrast the urban residents
are "ethnically heterogeneous" and economically and socially
differentiated. Within an urban setting one can find
members of several tribes, as well as Asians and Europeans
working together; social mobility is generally good.
Because of the sundry cultural backgrounds, members of a
tribe or group are socially apart from each other, even
though they may work together and/or live in the same neigh-
bo rhood.
The most important rural groupings ere based on common
18
residence and kinship. However the Sebei and the tribes of
the Karamojong Cluster are grouped according to age. The
leader of a cla.n is recognized largely on senority and
family position. Other positions of importance exist i.e.
the civil service (which can be achieved through education),
a knowledge of English, or other skills. It is easier for
those who came from recognized families to achieve new posi-
tions because they usually go to secondary and higher grade
schools for training that prepares them for the local and
national administrative position.
In the rural areas daily cooperation and social inter-
course often takes place. Two strong forces of solidarity
are marriage and kinship. Residents come and go but all
"current members cooperate." If a man helps his neighbor
to plant his field, he expects the same when his turn comes.
Neighbors consider each other as "social equals." For
example, if a person has authority as a local official of
the government, he does not necessarily get special re-
cognition in the neighborhood.
Local disputes are resolved by the leaders of clans;
the primary aim is to restore good relations in the commun-
ity in which a fine is paid in the form of beer and meat at
a reconcilation feast. Punishment is secondary but re-
fusal to pay the fine may result in ostracism.
The traditional political institutions were chiefdoms.
The most successful of these were Euganda, Huyora, loro,
and Ankole. because the chiefdoms of the Nilo tic-speaking
19
people of the north tended to subdivide, the British found
the "hierarchial system" of the bantu-speaking people of the
south more useful as a means of central administration.
As the British extended control of the country to the east,
north and west, the Buganda administrations "assumed that
leaders of kinship groups would be responsible for their
27people." Thus the chiefs became part of the governmental
structure of the British while simultaneously being re-
cognized as traditional rulers.
The chiefs maintained recipocal economic and social ties
with their people. They were given "money and goods as
tribute in return for protection, for settling disputes, for
assistance when needed, and for sponsering feasts and cele-
brations. The ability of the chief to do the latter de-
termined to a large extent the degree to which he would be
respected by his people and the British as a ruler. "In
the modern governmental system, the higher chiefs, have less
contact with the people and are concerned more with paper
28
work than with interpersonal relations." The latter is
reinforced by their constant transfer from one administrative
post to another.
As stated before, less than 5 percent of the population
of Uganda lives in the urban areas. Yet, the urban areas
are responsible to a great extent for shaping the "nation-
al social structure" in Uganda. The political and education-
al institutions are found there, as well as the major routes
of communication.
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The existence of the urban centers is due to the efforts
of Europeans and Asians to develope the political, social,
and economic structure of Uganda. Many Africans living in
the urban centers still have ties to the rural areas from
which they came. Some have acquired an education and other
"skills” that help them to become urbanized, while others
are relatives of earlier Kenyan immigrants who had adapted
themselves to "industrial and service positions." However,
most of the Africans in the urban areas are only temporary
residents.
As stated elsewhere, Europeans and Asians occupy
many of the skilled positions in business, industry and
the public services. Europeans have generally been a high-
er status group than Asians. Most of the former hold well-
paying skilled positions while the latter hold a variety of
semi-skilled and unskilled jobs, although of course many
are entrepreneurs.
The shape of the urban structure is changing as
Africans are increasingly being found "in top-level po-
sitions", and "at all social and economic levels." The
place of Europeans and Asians in Ugandan society is unten-
able to say the least. In general Europeans in Uganda are
employed only for a "specific time" and are engaged in the
process of "training Africans" who will replace them. The
desires of Africans to occupy the entrepreneurial and
clerical positions, along with the Governments push to
"localize job opportunities, has made Asians, especially
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those who are noncitizens, uneasy.
Some occupations ere more highly regarded i.e. univer-
sity teaching, law, medicine, civil service, and diplomatic
service. The occupations requiring less skill but still
highly regarded are those of "clerk" and "driver" respective-
ly.
Participation in public life can be made easier by the
ability to speak English. "Education and Government are
carried on through the medium of English, and a broader
range of activities and associations is available to English
29
speakers." most of the Africans who come to the urban
centers cannot speak English, have little or no education,
and lack specialized skills. They remain in towns long
enough to earn money. Those who stay usually maintain
their rural ties which tend to loosen with long urban stays.
Since it is difficult to make good kinship obligations over
long distances, often "the money earners are reluctant to
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respond to the monetary requests of poor relations."
The rural insti tiutions which are brought to the urban
areas by the Africans are adapted to the circumstances of new
enviroment. Kin group membership continues to structure
interpersonal relations, but often the basis for difining a
"kinman is artificially contrived." If a person's kin group
is not present, then he may develope ties with distant rel-
atives or non-kinsmen.
The place of residence tends to coincide with occupation-
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al categories. African laborers tend to live together on
the outskirts of towns, whereas teachers, clerks, and the
skilled live in other parts of the town. The two groups sel-
dom mix either at work or in social life.
Religious identification influences interpersonal re-
lations in the urban areas more than in the rural setting.
For example, the doctrines of Christianity, Islam, and
Hinduism are followed ’’strictly" by their adherents. Per-
sons of one church or sect participate in "educational, rec-
reational, and social activities."
Most of the urban dwellers are members of one or more
associations which perform many of the functions of the rural
neighborhood and kin groups. The most numerous associations
are those based on tribal identification. J)'or example in
Kampala., there are the Alur, Lugbara, and Sudanese Assoc-
iations and the Luo Union to name a few. There is no
Ganda or Soga association because these are the dominant
tribes of the area and therefore have no need to promote sol-
idari ty
.
The tribal associations are very structured in that they
have written constitutions, initiation fees, and monthly
dues. Luring the 1950’s many of the tribal associations
were formed for the purpose of participating in sports. The
tribal associations "do not engage in political activities."
Some tribal associations are organized in such a way
that they reflect the different economic levels of their
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members. For instance in the Luo Union, ’’top organization-
al level consists largely of educated English-speaking per-
manent urban residents "whose chief concern is "establishing
schools", and "building community centers." Some of the
Luo Union's members are active in public life. However,
many levels oi the Luo union act as local mutual aid socities
for the African laborers "who generally do not participate
in the activities of the larger association and are totally
3
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unaware of its existence."
The most important social unit for the majority of the
people o i Uganda is the family. A person's responsibility
to members of his immediate family and to the larger kin
group take "precedence over most other commitments and, to
a large degree, his life is shaped by and fulfilled through
his family."
in the urban areas the supply of labor vastly exceeds
the demand for it. The competition, therefore, for high
salaried jobs is very intense. The easiest way to eliminate
competition in the civil service, the army, the schools and
universities, the state corporations, etc. "is by making an
ethnic claim to the job and by mobolizing political support
on an ethnic basis. Lthnic conflict therefore becomes a
vicious cycle.
Although their total number is less than 10 percent of
the population, it is the "Muslims as well as the people
from Amin’s area who are getting the jobs—people from the
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West Nile—left vacated by the Asians."
CHAPTER IV
BUREAUCRATS WITH WEAPONS
A. Police
24
Responsibilty for law and order is the task of the
Uganda Police force. The Police force is directly responsi-
ble to the Minister of internal Affairs whose task it is
to administer the laws and emergency regulations designed
to"prevent public disorder and potential political unrest."^ 4
In remote rural areas, the customary criminal law is en-
forced by the local leaders and chiefs.
As of 1968 the Police force, a multi tribal and non-
political armed constabulary, was composed of approximately
8,000 men and officers, one of the "smallest proportion of
policemen" to population in Africa. In addition to regular
police duties, the force is used as a guard of honor for
visiting dignitaries, and although it was founded as a civil
force, it has been "assigned military duties." for example,
in World War II many policemen "were assigned to British
Army units and served" on several fronts "in Burma and East
35Asia. " J
The force has also been used on border patrols and
peace-keeping patrols in the Karamoja Bistrict in an effort
to prevent cattle-raiding and intertribal fights.
To discharge the sundry duties of the police force,
special units given "paramilitary training" were created.
As of 1966 the force consisted of a number of branches with
specific functions i.e. the Uniform Branch, performing urban
25
duties
,
Special Constabulary
5 Special Branch and Criminal
Investigation Dept; Railway Police; Air Wing Police Tracker
Force
; and the Special Force Unit to name a few.
The internal Security Unit formed after World War II
became the Special Forces Unit. When former President Obote
seized control of the government there were eighteen Special
Force Units with fifty men in each one. Since the former
President gradually depended more on the Special Force for
his power, it is likely that their manpower increased.
"The Special Force is a paramilitary organization trained in
r
commando tactics by Israeli instructors ." 9
The Air Wing Police Tracker Force which succeeded the
ha.ramoja. uonstabulary is also "organized along military
lines." They as well as the Special Forces Units, and the
Army co-operate in efforts to prevent cattle-raiding. Al-
though the raids have become less frequent, still hundreds
of cattle are stolen each year and "many" persons are
" slain.
"
In addition, the Special Police Forces have been called
upon to protect the borders, especially with the Sudan.
"Major problems of security" have resulted from the incur-
sian of more than 60,000 Sudanese refugees. Sudanese se-
curity forces have been in search ot political and military
refugees in Uganda. The Ugandan Government wants to pre-
vent the refugees from using Uganda.- as a base to attack the
Sudan. There is also concern that the refugees are trying
to get the support of the nugandan dissiuents in a joint
26
effort against Uganda and the Sudan. To prevent this, units
oi the Special forces and the Army continued in 1969 to
patrol and maintain positions near the border and near the
refugee ce.mps in the interior. As of 1970 there were about
”5,000 Armed Forces” and about ”5,500 police and Security
Forces” in Uganda.
B. Array
In 1961 the strength of the Army of Uganda amounted to
about 1,000 men and officers, the former 4th .battalion of
the British King’s African Rifles. At that time the train-
ing and equipment were all British. The first African to
become an officer "entered Sandhurst, the British military
academy in 1960."^'
by 1964 there were "about 2,000” men in the Army; in
that year the Armed Forces Act provided for more expansion
and the establishment of an Air Force. As of 1969 the Army
totalled 5 battalions or about 7,000 men with an Air Force
of about 260 men. There was no navy.
Uganda has since the early 1960's accepted military
aid from both the West and the East. British officers com-
manded the Army until 1964 at which time the Africans they
had been training to command took control of the Army. Air-
craft and training for pilots were recieved from Israel,
Uzecho Slovakia, and the Soviet Union.
The primary aim of the Armed Forces is the defense of
Uganda's territory from outside agression. The secondary aim
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is to aid the police in order to maintain public order and
internal security. As already stated, the most pressing
problems are cattle-raiding and the 60,000 Sudanese refugees.
The Constitution of 1967 gave former President Obote
the power to determine the operational uses of the Armed
forces . He also had the power to appoint, dismiss, and
promote as well as being designated the Commander in Chief.
In theory Parliament had the legal right to regulate the
latter powers.
To maintain command of the Army, Obote depended heavily
on an officer corps which was predominently composed of his
fellow Wilo tic-speaking northerners. for example in the
Crisis of May 1966 between the Kabaka of duganda and the na-
tional government, it was the Army which moved decisively
against the "armed guard" of Mutesa II. The loyality of the
Armed forces to the central government led by Obote provid-
ed him with a necessary means of power; in the longrun,
however, this dependence on the Army foreshadowed Obote'
s
fall from power.
Until 1397 the backbone of Uganda’s Army was composed
of Sudanese regulars and Eritish officers; during that year
there was a mutiny because of " di sati sfaction with pay and
constant duty on distant patrols." As a result the Sudanese
were slowly disarmed and the ethnic base of the Army was
broadened to include many Ugandan tribes and the Swahili.
In 1900 they were formed into the King's African Hi lies.
The latter consisted of the 4th and the 5th battalions of
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which the 5th wes disbanded in 1913.
By 1930 "all o i the major tribes were represented"^
in the 4th Battalion, although the Nilo tic-speaking people
of the north, especially the Acholi who in 1962 formed the
nucleus of the independent Uganda Rifles, predominated. Dur-
ing World War II the 4th took part in the defect of the
1 talians in Saroalila.nd and Rthiopia, and in the reconouest
of Burma from the Japanese. World War II was the "first time
that these African troops had fought outside the continent
of Africa.
in 1926 the 4th battalion became the 1st Battalion
Uganda Rifles. In 1964 members of the Uganda Rifles took the
Minister of the Interior as a hostage in a fight to get more
pay and increased Africanization of the officer corps. Three
days later on January 25, Obote asked for and recieved
British troops who disarmed the Ugandan troops.
Africanization of the officer corps began immediately.
Shaban Opolot and Idi Amin were appointed to command the two
Battalions of the Uganda Rifles. Qldi Amin first joined
the 4th Uganda British KAR (King's A.frican Riflesj as a
private in 1946." In 1961, he advanced by grade to colonel.
He served in Burma during World War 11 and in Kenya during
the Mau Mau emergencyT] 40 On July 1,1964 the Army command
was turned over to Opolot who was promoted to brigadier by
Obote three months later. Amin served as the Army Chief of
Staff. Also the Uganda Air Force was formed under the con-
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trol of the Army.
As Commander in Chief, the President, according to the
Armed Forces Act of 1964, was to he advised by the Defense
Council on things such as command, administration, and dis-
cipline. The Council was composed of the Minister of De-
fense, The Chief of the Defense Staff, the Army Chief of
Staff, the Air Force Chief of Staff, and others that "the
President may appoint."
By the end of February, 1966 Brigadier Opolot was re-
lieved of his command of the Armed Forces because former
President Obote realized that he could not be counted on to
support the government. He was replaced by Colonel idi
Amin the then Chief of the Defense Staff who was promoted to
Brigadier of the Uganda Army and Air Force as well as retain-
ing his position as Chief of the Defense Staff. Former
Brigadier Opolot was discharged from the Army and put in de-
tention. "In April 1968 Brigadier idi Amin was promoted to
major general, and two colonels were given the rank of
41brigadier.
"
in Uganda, as in many developing nations, the Army has
become a symbol of independence. "Independence led immedi-
ately, whether one desired it or not, to the creation of an
army .
"
4 ^ Futhermo re "the Army by virtue of its hierarchical
setup and its strength based on discipline, it is believed,
provides to some extent the requisite atmosphere for creating
national unification." 45 The Army performs a useful role
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in the maintenance o i internal security and the protection
of its borders, not so much against invasion by any of its
neighbors as against refugees looking for a base from which
to launch raids into their own countries.
The Uganda Armed Forces were "expected to be non-pol-
itical." Army personnel "are not permitted to take part
44in party politics," nor are they permitted to run for e-
lected public office. Recruitment is on a volunteer basis;
the pay and training "is sufficient" to attract new recruits.
"Recruitment has generally been more successful in the north,
especially among the Nubian descendants of former .British
troops, among the Acholi tribesmen, who traditionally seek
their fortune away from home as young men, and among those
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of President Obote’s tribe, the Lango . " The high ranks
have mostly been filled by the northerners.
Tensions have at times existed between the civilian pop-
ulation and the military. The use of the military in the
crisis of 1966 "has residual consequences." For example
the Euganda people were against this so emergency regulations
were necessary and also the chiefs oi other tribes became
fearful of the power of former President Obote. The Army
has, therefor, tried to "intergrate their members into na-
tional life" in order to gain a base from which to make the
people of Uganda better understand the role of the military.
And at public reviews government officials explain the role
of the military to the public.
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Miltary expenditures have risen sharply since 1963
when it was "1.6 percent of the total expenditure" to 1970
when it was about 10 percent. These figures do not, how-
ever, represent the amount of foreign aid Uganda has re-
cieved in the form of arms, equipment, and training assis-
tance, the exact figure of which is not known. Uganda has
accepted jet fighter aircraft from the Soviet Union, and a
number of Air Force pilots have been sent to the Soviet Union
and Czechoslovakia for training. isreal has supplied mil-
itary expertise and assistance i.e. the first pilots for
the Uganda Air korce were trained in Isreal. But since the
Arab-Isreali War in 1967, Uganda has regularly voted for the
Arabs
.
32
CHAPTER V
SEARCH FOR UNITY
A. Buganda vs. Obote
In the late 1950 ’ s just a few years "before Uganda "be-
came independent there was talk of creating a federation of
the East African countries. (This was an effort by the
British to find a stable structure before they pulled out.)
The Kabaka of Buganda was vehementaly opposed to this be-
cause it would virtually rob him of all his political power.
In the meantime the British called for elections to be
held to decide who would rule Uganda while the British were
preparing to leave.
The Kabaka’ s reaction was a boycott of the elections
and an assertion of the right of Buganda to secede from
Uganda. The British response to Buganda’ s right to secede
was a flat ’no’ and as to the Kabaka’ s boycott of the elec-
tions the British answer was to accept Mr. Benedict Kiwa.n-
uka, the President of the Democratic Party, as the winner
with only 3 percent of the votes cast in Buganda.
Mr. Kiwanuka then became the chief minister when Bri-
tian gave Uganda internal self-government in May, 1961.
This was considered an affront to the Kabaka because he
had ordered a boycott of the elections in Buganda. Kir.
Kiwanuka’ s victory, however, made inter-party politics in
Buganda inevitable. For soon the Kabaka (the King of
huganda) realized that if he were to maintain power he would
have to get in tune with the new political
climate in Uganda.
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Therefore, the Kabaka Yekka (King Alone) Party wps formed,
in April, 1962 another election was held: the DP (Democra-
tic Party) won 24 seats, UPC (Uganda People's Congress) led
by Obote won 37 seats, and the Buganda Lukiiko won 21 seats.
The 21 Buganda Lukiiko representatives (members of the KY
Party) were personally hand picked by the Kabaka to represent
Buganda in the national Assembly. Since the Kabaka picked
the Lukiiko candidates, it was clear that for a political
party to have a majority in the Assembly it would need the
personal approval of the Kabaka.
It was with the KY
,
a traditional and ethnic group par-
ty
,
that Cbote, the leader of the UPC, a nationalist party,
formed an uneasy alliance which led to a coalition central
government under which Uganda became independent on October 9,
1962.
Association of a political party with traditional
authority in an area meant immediate m?ss support fo the par-
ty, but at the expense of national unity. "Most traditional
leaders were regional-minded and as such endangered party
A r
unity on a national level." The most important fact was
that alliances with traditional leaders were within themselves
a danger to unity. Bor example, the alliance between the
KY and the UPC automatically meant the loss of Bunyoro sup-
port to the UPC because of the "Lost Countries" issue that
Bunyoro had with Buganda.
The following four years (1962-1966) saw the break-up
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o t the All
i
3 nc 6 tor 9. numher ox rG&sons 1 . e . i)P speakers
constantly referred to the fact that the Lukiiko represen-
tatives were hand picked by the Kabaka and therefore alleged
that control of the central government was in the hands of
Buganda.
Nevertheless, in October, 1963, Sir Edward Mutesa ll,
the Kabaka of Uganda, was elected the President of Uganda.
it soon became apparent though that the KY was having
internal problems. The KY was an alliance between the
" tradionali sts" and the "progressives" . The latter were in
genera.l educated men who formed the alliance to defeat the
Catholic oriented UP. What the "progressives" wanted was a
representative form of government in Buganda and land reform.
The Kabaka, of course, wanted the traditional authority to
remain. The diametric points of view lead to the splitting
up of the KY, as the "progessives" defected to the UPC.
On August 24, 1964, Mr. Obote ended the alliance with
the Kabaka; the next day on August 25, the National Assembly
approved a government motion setting November 4, 1964, as
the date fra referendum to settle the issue of the "Lost
Counties." This infuriated the Kabaka and his followers in
Buganda, a,s the "Lost Counties" which were ceded io Buganda
by the British in the 1890’ s were considered an intergral part
of Buganda. Therefore, on August 31, the KY members walk-
ed out of the National Assembly when the bill was passed
setting November 4, 1964, as the date to settle the issue
The issue was decided in Novemberof the "Lost Counties'.'
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as the "Lost Counties" voted to return to nunyoro.
Also to confuse m? tters at this time, charges were
"brought against the former Prime Minister Obote and Army
Chief of Staff Colonel Idi Amin; it was alleged that they had
made illicit de' Is in ivory, gold, and coffee amounting to
4359,000, with the Congolese rebels. This became a dramatic
turning point in Uganda’s political history. For fearing
his own position, Mr. Obote took control of the government
in February, 1966.
When Obote overthrew the Kabaka in the name of national
unity and stability, he hoped that this would create sup-
port for him outside of Buganda. But the loyalities of the
masses, "Especially in the kingdoms of Bunyoro, Ankole,
Toro, and Busogo, were not with national causes but with
47their respective kings." The suspension of the Constitu-
tion was itself viewed as a threat to the kingdoms, as it
manifested the power of Obote in overthrowing the Kabaka,
with apparent ease.
Mr. Obote encountered further problems as he could not
depend on his party. The reason for this is that on Feb-
ruary 22, 1966, he ordered the arrest of Ibingira, Secretary
General of the UPC and four other members. There was too
much confusion in the UPC for anyone to depend on it for
political power. Consequently, the attack on the Kabaka’
s
palace lead to a political system of government . that was
unitary and based on the use of military and police Lorce.
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Ihe politic 1 history of Uganda, the immovable ethnic group
loyalities and the absence of anything that could be con-
sidered as a national consensus, before and after indepen-
dence made it necessary for a nationalist like Obote to use
force
.
To most Ugandan’s the "desires, goa.ls, and dreams are
for modernization, while their political loyalities are
still committed to the traditional values and institutions
4R
of government." ' Since the peasantry make up about 95
percent of the population, Obote probably saw force as a
necessary means of achieving his goal of a united Uganda.
Yet, there was a growing sense of fear and frustration
for the material needs of the masses were not met nor did
the peasantry abandon their traditional loyalities to their
deposed leaders. The government of Mr. Obote, therefore,
had to continuously use force to keep control in the hope of
creating a consensus. This lack of confidence in the
government became evident in December, 1969, when an attempt
was made on Obote’ s life.
While in power, Obote tried to build cohesion with
consensus; he achieved cohesion but not consensus. because
education meant so much to Ugandan's, he tried to use it to
"promote national consciousness." This new social and pol-
itical consciousness did not bring about consensus! Obote
soon realized that although all Ugandan's were for education,
to further their own or the groups ends,it was only a means
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and not "national interests." The reason for this is that
Ugandan’s view education as a preparation for employment.
^i^Tier with the government, local authorities, the commercial
sector, or the missionaries. This was typical of colonial
education end it changed little after Obote took over.
People were "more interested in the availability of education
AO
than in its content." v To eggrevate the situation, the
availability of education has not increased job opportunities
so that the most educated man in Uganda is generally uproot-
ed by his education from the traditional way of living.
The latter is a source of political instability.
Another problem is that Obote increased the salaries of
the army and the police to keep them loyal to him because
of their "lack of education and ideologolical and political
50
commitments." but to meet the new governmental expendi-
tures the government imposed higher taxes. Meanwhile, the
main source of income for the masses, coffee and cotton were
in abundance on the international market so that the farmer
was getting lower prices for his efforts.
B. Ideology and Force
Although, Obote was powerful enough to eradicate
"traditional authority in Uganda," he was destined to hold
that power for as long as the police and the army were pre-
pared to enforce his authority.
The Armed Forces entered Uganda’s politica.1 liie with
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the mutiny in 1964. Very few soldiers were reprimanded;
they were "bought off" by pay raises and better conditions
as well as by the Africanization program in the officer
corps which was accelerated. The latter saw the rapid pro-
motion of NCO's like Amin.
from now on the soldiers realized that they had the po-
wer to make their demands felt by the leaders of Uganda;
furthermore, "the failure to punish many of the rank and file
leaders of the mutiny along with the NuO promotions weakened
the rigid hierarchical discipline of the colonial armed
51forces." Personal, factional, and tribal considerations
became a primary concern in the effort to maintain the mil-
itary chains of command.
'l'he events of 1966 put a strain on army discipline and
cohesiveness even further as the second in command, Colonel
Amin, led the armed forces against Buganaa and the dissident
Ministers and the imposition of the army's will over the
hated "southerners" by intimidation created a dangerous pre-
cedent.
Until the assasination attempt in 1969 Obote attempted
to but off army support. Thereafter, he attempted to get
full support of the army by the Langi and Acholi promotions
and by increasing the forces of the USU. The confrontation
between him and Amin was inevitable.
While Obote "was proposing to put all means of produc-
tion in the hands of the people ('Move to the Lett declared
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in In te 1969), the people found themselves not only with
little direct economic benefits in terms of wages and sala-
ries but threatened with legal actions if they wanted to
strike as a means of pushing for better wages.
It was an effort to improve his position as ruler, to
find a basis for national unity, and to devise an idealogy
for the masses: the forces of feudalism, tribalism, and
capitalism (the enemy) were undermining the class solidarity
of the ' Comma.n Man. ' .behind his solution was an increasing
reliance on force and violence.
The tactic behind the "Move to the Left" was to iden-
tify class formation as the enemy of Uganda. It seems that
it was 0 bote's purpose to eliminate those he could not
trust. After the assassination attempt he trusted no one-
l
viajor-deneral Amin included. As stated before, he acceler-
ated during 1970, the growth of the Special Forces and
Akena Adoko's secret police (GSU) and within the army
"Langi and Acholi officers were given rapid promotion and an
attempt was made to isolate ana neutralize Amin. in theory
then, Obote was proposing a socialist revolution to provide
the masses with an ideology in order to lead them to nation-
al unity, but in fact he wanted to strengthen his own po-
sition by a realigment of forces composed of the army,
Langi and the Acholi, and a younger generation of UPC lead-
ers loyal to him.
Amin, senior public servants, politicians, and party
EGYPT
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officers saw in Quote's ’Move to the Left’ a strategy "to
exclude them from access to power, wealth, and status."^
They also feared their personal safety as well as the domin-
ation of Ohote's langi tribe and "to a lesser extent the
Acholi over the other tribes."
Obote’s ’Move to the Left’ was also viewed with suspi-
cion by Kenya as Mr. Kenyatta saw in it a move to deprive
Kenya of its economic strength in the East African ’Common
Market’; the members of the ’Common Market' are Kenya,
Uganda and Tanzania. Since Mr. Nyerere of Tanzania was lean-
ing towards Communist China in ideology, and now Obote was
proclaiming a leftist orientation, Mr. Kenyatta feared that
Tanzania and Uganda would undermine Kenya's economic and
political stability. (Kenya is democratic and capitalistic
in orientation.)
'nother thing which upset Mr. Kenyatta was Obote’s
"localization" program which resulted in "30,000 Kenyans re-
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turning to their homeland." it is because of this that
there was speculation that Kenya might close "the harbour of
Mombasa, Uganda's vital outlet to the sea." (Look at map)
Obote while "on his way to Kampala from the Commonwealth
conferences in Singapore at which he played a leading role
in the campaign to block a resumption of .British arms sales
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to South Africa" was ousted from power.
In retrospect there was very little in Obote' s Charter
which was relevant to the agriculture sector of the economy;
it was mainly addressed to the urban sector. It was only
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those who were at the bottom that "were being asked to make
sacrifices i.e. the rank and file "bureaucrats
^
oome further points are in order to demonstrate the con-
ditions that existed prior to Obote ’s ouster.
With his popularity decreasing, Obote became less tol-
erant o t criticisms and political acts by his opponents to-
wards the government. The outcome wa.s the Preventive De-
tention Act and the state of emergency in Duganda; under these
conditions the person detained had to be informed of the
charges against him but the government did not have to bring
him to trial or to make public the charges on which he was
detained: hence the "Five Ministers" detained from 1966
until 'min took control of the government in 1971.
In a little more than two years after Obote’ s coup in
1966, there were more than 50 important political people in-
carcerated. Sir William Wilberforce JNIadiope
,
former king
of Busoga, former vise president of Uganda and a man with
an apparently large following in Jbusoga, was one of those
detained. When Amin seized control of the government, he
freed many of the political prisoners. Out of prison, Sir
Wilberforce Nadiope, on March 7, 1971, said that over
"4,000 people" had been incarcerated during Obote’ s nine
years in power compared to only "35 people" during the 70
years of British rule.
The assasination attempt on Obote ’s life on December 19,
1969 thrust Uganda into "ruthless authoritian rule." There-
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after the emergency regulations that had existed in Buganda
since 1966 were extended to the whole country. There follow-
ed a ban on all opposition organizations and membership so-
cities i.e. the Democratic Party and the Uganda Farmers
voice. On December 20, 1969, Mr. Benedict Kiwanuka, presi-
dent of the Democratic Party, the only opposition party in
Parliament, was arrested. The assassination attempt then for-
ced "one party politics in Uganda." 58
By early 1970, it was clear that Obote' s problems were
not just with the masses who viewed his government as an
"illegitimate dictatorship," but with the intellectuals who
had been sympathetic to his bid for national unity and not
a one party state.
Then to appease the neighboring heads of state in
Tanzania and Kenya, and opposition at home, Obote in early
1970 said that general elections would be held in April, .1971.
But in August, 1970, Obote’s party delegate conference
"passed a resolution which made the ruling party’s leader
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automatically the country's president." Since his party was
the dominant one and most of the opposition was in jail,
this virtually meant his re-election. To make matters even
worse he proposed that the president "nominate his own in-
terim successor.
"
It was becoming "common gossip in Uganda that Akena
Adoka, Obote' s cousin and head of the ’secret police' or the
general service department, was to be Obote'
s
first choice
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for the high court." The successor had to he a high
court judge. Mr. Akena was the most "feared man in Uganda
as head of the ’secret police’." Next to Obote he was the
most powerful man in the country. It is also believed that
he helped formulate the Common Man's Charter ('Move to the
heft') which officially put Uganda on the road to socialism.
Ey the end of 1970, it became evident that Cbote did
not intend to leave office, so that "forcible overthrow car-
ried out by the only powerful, highly organized and disciplin-
6
1
ed group" within Uganda— the military was necessary.
Under Obote' s dictatorial rule a national consciousness
of fear and hatred developed. The masses for the moment
saw beyond ethnic group politics. 411 Ugandans seemed to
wish for one thing: the ouster of Obote which came about by
his own hand picked military leaders on January 25, 1971.
Approximately 70 persons were killed in the fighting. A
Kampala radio broadcast on January 25, announced that the
coup had taken place and accused Obote of having developed
his home region in northern Uganda at the expense of other
parts of the country; he wa.s also accused of having pursued
6 2
an economic policy for "the rich, big men."'
"As Major Ueneral Idi Amin Dada, the head of Uganda's
military government, put it, 'A great heavy weight had been
lifted off the shoulders of the general public and so they
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went almost wild with joy’."
There was an immediate desire by farmers, civil ser-
vants, workers, and intellectuals to cooperate with the mil-
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itary regime of Amin. There was a "promise" of a free gen-
eral election.
Obote introduced a unitary form of government into
Uganda after his coup in February, 1966. However, he was
not considered a symbol of unity.
President/deneral Amin is the first national image of
Uganda and a person other than a king or traditional ruler
that people from all parts of Uganda regard as a legitimate
ruler. In 1971, Amin became Uganda’s symbol of national
unity.
Will the politics of Amin’s regime be dictated by the
traditional vs. the national, or is it possible to have mass
support for the government? The next half of the paper will
attempt to bring this into focus.
CHAPTER VI
ARMY ASSERTS ITS INTERESTS
In 1964, the army mutinies in Uganda stopped short at
strikes over pay. However, they bring into focus not only
the factors which lead to Amin’s military take over, but
they also give clues as to the reasons behind the frequency
of African army strikes against governments.
The immediate reasons for the coup vary according to
the source. One version felt that the army acted to forestall
President Milton Obote’s intention to use a loyal or tribal
section of the army against Major-General Idi Amin and his
supporters, and that General Amin’s coup was a counter to
troop movements ordered by Brigadier Suleiman acting for Obote.
(Obote allegedly ordered Langi and Acholi soldiers to kill
fellow soldiers who were not loyal to him.)
Another version has it that the plotting for take-over
was done by Amin; this was against the background of bitter
rivalry between the army command and the special forces and
intelligence apparatus headed by Akena Adoka; that the
police uncovered the plot; and that orders were given for
the rounding up of the plotters but that these were intercep-
ted by Amin’s men who were able thus to strike first. nd
still yet a.nother version provided by former President
Obote is that the day before he left for the Commonwealth
Conference in Singapore, he ordered General Amin to account
for the disappearance of military equipment and for corruption
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involving sums in the neighborhood of 2i million pounds.
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(The \udi tor-General
' s report which was presented to the Gov-
ernment in March 1970, end which, though not offically re-
leased, was leaked to a London newspaper in the autumn, un-
covered glaring i'ininacial ineptitudes in all departments of
State, but particularly in the Department of Defense where
three bank accounts were heavily overdrawn.
Which ever of the versions or parts thereof is correct
they all lead to one inescapable conclusion: the coup was
an act of self-defense by an army command--or at least a
sufficiently large section which sided with General Amin in
a divided command to swing a coup d'etat-- that felt itself
perilously insecure. The coup in effect was a pre-emptive
strike
.
Like almost all African armies, Uganda's was a. colonial
inheritance, refashioned from the former British officered
King's African Kifles in which Major-General Amin had himself
once served alongside Eritish troops in Burma and against the
Mau Mau in Kenya. it was a force that was traditionally
selected from the Miotic peoples of the North, which peoples
were, significantly, also those from whom the Obote Govern-
ment derived its major political support. This composition
of the army and the Government's political base was deepened
by the 1966 crisis in which the army was used decisively to
break Baganda power.
Bor in that year, when Buganda's challenge to the au-
thority of the central Government came to a head, it was
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General Amin who led the attack on the Kabaka ’ s Palace which
decided the issue. in the simultaneous crisis inside Obote'
s
party and Cabinet, it was again the army and General Amin
who came to 0 bote's aid.
The army was thus a key instrument of presidential po-
wer at the time of the alienation of uaganda support, as well
as compensation for an organizationally weak and faction-
ridden Uganda People’s Party. { There was a growing polarity
within the Uganda. People's Congress between those who support-
ed Ibingira, the Secretary of the UPC. There was a substan-
tial group within the UPC that was attracted to the idea of
change in the top leadership, however, Obote foiled the
Ibingira faction which were known as the southern or "Bantu"
family; Ibingira was one of the "five ministers" who were
arrested on February 22, 1966, for "plotting" against the gov-
ernment. )
The new unitary State fashioned by Obote--from which the
kingdoms disappeared, and with them competing systems of
political power and, in the case of Buganda, even two com-
peting armed forces—meant that the President could rule with-
out the formerly crucial support o f the Ba.ganda, but that
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the army was increasing its political power m Uganda.
Obote seemed to be aware of the danger of this over-de-
pendence on the army. He resorted to two strategies: first,
to form the special force of the General Service Unit in
order to weaken the army command as the sole arbiter of phy-
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si cal power; snd second, the formation of the ’Uommon man’s
Charter’ was an attempt tp make the politics of Uganda left-
ist in orientation. The ’charter’ was in fact sub- titled
’ Jj'irst Steps for Uganda to Move to the Left', and it pro-
posed to strengthen the public and co-operative sectors of
the economy while at the same time attempting to weaken the
grip of foreign capital. The perspective was that popular
support would in time not only create a momentum for social
change but would also bring grass-root support to the party
and thus lessen dependence on the army.
The leftward turn went rather slowly. When the coup
took place the nationalization program was only in mid-stream.
The attempt to turn to the left had the effect of disgrunt-
ling those of the elite who preferred a Mercedes Eenz to a.
bicycle, and of preparing them as potential allies of any
force that would challenge this direction of government. As
everywhere else where the same policy has been tried, the
attempts to diversify the armed forces command served to pro-
voke the army rather than weaken it.
In Uganda it was the formation of the USU and the in-
telligence apparatus under Akena Adoko--which also collect-
ed intelligence about the army itself— that more than any-
thing else incited the army to take over control of the gov-
ernment.
The Uganda army was a very restless one; the government’s
policy to placate the army after the 1964 Jinjc- oarracks
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mutiny and to expand it--not surprising in view of the
three troublesome borders, with the Congo, Rwanda, and the
Sudan--did little if anything to control this restlesness.
The mutineers won their major demands, from increase in pay
to the Africanization of the officer corps. The latter
meant the immediate substitution of British officers by non-
commissioned officers, mostly old army hands from the North,
promoted from the ranks.
However, there was much there was much trouble in the
army which in part reflected the tension between the small
number of Sandhurst- trained men, mostly younger officers
and educated Southerners, and the majority of Northerners pro-
moted from the ranks. Several of the "abortive inner-army
coups that have occured since 1965, seem to have been attemp-
rr-1
ted convergences" ' between anti-Obote Southern oppostion
both outside and within the army. For example, in October
1965, a number of "junior officers were court-martialled on
be
charges of secretely moving troops and arms on the capital."
in later years there were other plots, though they remain of
rather obscure origin: there were for example strong tugs-
of-war in the command that coincided with political tensions,
as is the case in ma jor-deneral Amin’s appointment as de
facto commander of the army in February 1966 in place of
Brigadier Opolot.
Also because of the policy of diversified training mis-
sions, command tension would as a result intensify. Since
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the use of one foreign power for training end supplies
makes the African armed forces dependent on that foreign po-
wer, so, conversely, the use of several sources of assistance
is likely to import any difference and conflicts between them
into the local commands. (Even the small air force w?s di-
vided in two: one section using French aircraft but train-
ed by Isreal, and the other using MI Os and trained by the
Soviet Union.
)
During 1970, Obote's attempts to lessen dependence on
the army led increasingly to strains between him and General
Amin. They are known to have had differences i.e. Obote's
policy of forbidding Southern Sudanese secessionist groups
from carrying out military operations from bases in the Uganda
side of the boader. However, their differences arose more
from the civil-military equilibrium Obote was trying to a-
chieve than anything else. Three events pointed toward the
imminent crisis. First, there was the attempted assassination
of Obote in December 1969. Second, a little over a month
after the latter incident. Brigadier Okaya, the deputy army
commander, was killed; he was a strong Obote supporter so
that his death weakened Obote's hold on the army immensely.
Third, in October 1970, there were the incidents that cul-
minated in Amin's temporary house arrest and then in his
being shoved upstairs to become head of the armed forces--
a move which was supposed to deprive him of his operational
control of combat units.
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: n attempt was made to implicate Amin in the murder of
Brigadier Pierino Yere Okoya, Commanding Officer of Uganda’s
Second infantry Brigade within weeks after the attempt on
Obote’s life in December, 1969.
The animosity between Amin and Obote increased further
because of tribal frictions within the /' rmy. The frictions
were caused particularly by mounting discontent on the p^rt
of the Acholi (a warlike tribe who once dominated the Army)
and the Baganda (who provided many of the officers) at the
heavy recruitment from and hasty promotion of rank and file
soldiers from Northern tribes, especially those in Amin’s
West Nile District. Although Obote, a iMortherner, encouraged
Amin in his quest for a iMorthern-dominated Army, the result-
ant military instability-accompanied by rising economic in-
stabili ty--did little to enhance political stability. Obote’s
obvious attempts to "neutralize” Amin eventually caused Amin
to take action first.
The events that led to Amin's arrest are vague to say
the least. One story has it that he tried unsuccessfully to
stage a coup} a.nother that his moving of troops to the cap-
ital was a reminder to the government that the army was the
real power in Uganda.
Whatever the reason or reasons for his arrest there were
by this time several incentives for an army coup i.e. the
decline in (ieneral Amin's functions, and the formation of the
'special forces'. 'When he gained power, u-eneral Amin a-
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bolished the GSU end the Intelligence Ministry. He then im-
mediately set about the task of increasing the size of his
army; there is a large mercenary contingent of which the "sol-
diers owe loyali ty to him, not to Uganda.” 69
The coup was an assertion of army self-interest, made by
officers concerned with material rewards and their profession-
al survival, but also with their autonomous power. Most
easily recognizable for this assertion of army corporate in-
terests is the coup where the army has acted as an armed trade
union, as the 1964 mutiny in Uganda shows; the issues in this
instance were service conditions and low pay. But even
where there are more complex reasons for a coup the military
invariably sees to its own benefit after the take-over.
It is necessary and inevitable that the civil service
work with the army, for no military regime could survive
very long without the civil servants running the a dmini stration.
The bureaucratic strata of society-army and civil service-
use up an enormous proportion of the resources of the state.
Their interests lie in preserving the artificial standards
of the elite of which they are a part as a result of the col-
onial salary scales they have inherited. Obviously, then
since they have a large stake in the economy, explosive pol-
itical situations have a direct bearing on them. In this
light the coup then is seen as a "means to preserve or revamp
70
the State machinery from which they- benefit so much."
in general, the coup syndrome is the result of Uganda’s,
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as well as, Africa's economic dependence. This is the
root of the constant political crisis. Political sovereign-
ty is not enough to break the dependence of the colonial
situation. Without a developed economy and developed social
forces, the new State is seen not only as the seat of gov-
ernment but also as the primary source of employment, the
chiet agent for the build-up of capital, the principal chan-
nel of development funds, and the dispenser of patronage.
With all these functions it is to the government then that
discontent is focused.
Where economies grow too slowly to absorb all aspirants
for elite status, let alone to meet the needs of the con-
spicuously poor, the heat of successive political crises is
generated largely by the "constant flow of contestants for
7
1
the top salaried and command positions." With independence
the politicians take hold of the command positions. When
the latter fail to satisfy aspirations or resolve conflicts,
power then begins to swing to another elite. The new elite
for Uganda in 1971, was the bureaucracy, made-up of the army
and the civil service, which derive authority from their
direct physical manipulation of the State and their technical
expertise in running it.
The army and the civil service, together, make for a
very strong contesting layer within the elite group. Due
to their colonial origin, when they were institutions man-
ipulated by external controllers, and to the economically
rootless nature of indigenous political power in Uganda, the
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army pnd the civil service have a special degree of autonomy
from the government and political parties that control it.
Their power is thus independent of any ruling party.
A coup once made is easy to unmake by a counter-coup.
Uganda’s army as in general most armies, represents cross-
currents of ethnic, regional, social, and political divi-
sions within the broader community. It is because of this
that once the army takes control of the government, it is
immediately presented with many problems. Tension develops
within the officer corps and in the ranks. lMow, there are
even wider circles of contestants for office and power and
the economic rewards that come with them--as well as soldiers,
ana civil servants, and politicians waiting in the wings till
they can stage a come-back.
New and younger layers of the elite begin to emerge.
This is so because, at the crucial formative stages of
Uganda's army, it was not the sons of professional or bus-
iness families who enlisted, but the sons of people gener-
ally living in more remote, poorer, and under-developed areas.
The coup catapults then into government and opportunity not
only for the soldiers but also for their kinsfolk.
Sometimes groups dispossessed of government at an earl-
ier time may find their re-entry to the center of the stage
because of a coup--which the uaganda seemingly hoped would
happen when when Amin seized control of the government.
As long as the army remains in the barracks its command
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structure and its military discipline hold it together, un-
less of course there is a mutiny over pay. But once the
army enters government, the possession of power proceeds to
divide it. The source of the division may he either ri-
valry due to different generations in the officer corps or
to promotion bottlenecks.
In Uganda’s army the prospects of a counter-coup are
strong. The Baganda, Acholi, Langi
,
Lugbora, and Madi are
waiting for their chance, and now it appears that Catholics
and Protestants have joined them. (To be discussed later.)
A counter-coup need not re-instate the earlier form of gover-
nment or those removed from power; it could bring forth dis-
tinct variations grounded in different expendiencies for
power. Much depends on how long the military Government by
General Amin can stay cohesive.
If Uganda is to return to civilian rule, the problem
still remains of formulating a strategy for more rapid and
indigenous economic development, and, at the same time, pop-
ular mobilization for the social changes that will make this
development possible; and of finding counter-vailing for-
ces, and not necessarily armed ones, against the coup mak-
ing propensity in Uganda’s army.
Nevertheless
,
a couple of things have become very clear.
The coup, on Ja.nuary 2 5
,
1971
,
demonstrated that "the mili-
tary leaders acted as a veto group, blocking policies
7 2
which threatened their position." more importantly "the
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option of being apolitical is,” no longer ’’open to African
73
Array officers.” This is so because one of the ’’few av-
enues of political change” is the use or threat of force by
the military.
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CHAPTER VII
POLITICS WITHOUT IDEOLOGY
(1970-72)
The regime lost much of its earlier support because it
not only estranged the Lango
,
former President 0 bote's peo-
ple, but also the Acholi, at one time a powerful element in
the army, the Karamojong, the Asian community and, most sig-
nificantly, the powerful royalist faction of Buganda.
There was hope that the general election that Obote
announced would bring about a reconciliation between the Ba-
ganda and the rest of Uganda. "The electoral scheme was de-
signed so that every mP would have to contest and gain a
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significant number of votes" in four constituencies, one
in each of the four Regions of Uganda.. (Obote divided
Uganda into four districts.) Thus the Baganda, who consti-
tuted a region themselves, would have had a say in the elec-
tion of the Baganda. mPs. "By January, 1971, many leading
Baganda were compaigning for Parliament, including some of
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the respected clan leaders."
However, as stated before, events took a dramatic change
when General Amin took control of the government on January 25,
1971.
Amin claimed that Acholi and Lango soldiers--two of the
regions which contributed most oi the strength to the army
and the UPC—were moving, by order from Obote, to disarm the
rest of the army, so that he had to act to prevent them.
This seems unlikely though since Obote was out oi the country
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at the time along with his head of intelligence Akena Adoko;
also Obote'
s
trusted paramilitary police, the Special Force,
were not involved in the fighting.
Late in 1970, General Amin had become politically ac-
tive by identifying himself with anti-Obote elements i.e.
the Uganda Muslim Congress led by Prince Badru Kakungulu, a
respected Muganda leader and uncle of the Kabaka, as well as
with Obote’s former coleague, the Defense Minister and UPC
Secretary-General F'elix Onama. The latter had in August 1970,
made his first moves to unseat Obote by defeating his pro-
posals for a Presidential elections. hut Obote outmaneouvred
his opponents inside the party, as previously stated, at a
special UPC Congress in December, 1970, so that it was clear
that if he was to be removed action had to be taken fast.
Amin moved and on assuming power he declared, "I am not
a politician but 1 am a professional soldier. . .Mine will
be purely a caretaker admini stration. " He did not proclaim
any dramatic change in ideology but said he reacted only to
prevent the Langi and Acholi from controlling the army. The
’18 Points’ given by the soldiers as their reasons for giving
power to Amin complained about lack of freedom, violent
crime, economic problems, corruption, disunity in Uganda,
and neglect of the army. There was a promise to organize
elections and hand power back to the civilians.
The first act of the new regime was to free 55 of the 78
political detainees—why the others were not known. At
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both the local and the national governmental levels poli-
ticians were suspended from office. "Most professional
soldiers are reputed to be skeptical of politicians. Cer-
tainly the Genral has excluded them from any control over
7 AUganda’s affairs." The new Council of Ministers was com-
posed mostly of "career administrators" i.e. six civil ser-
vants, two diplomats, two Ugandans from the hast African
Community corporations and a Professor. There were only two
soldiers appointed: Amin and Lt. Col. E.A.T. Obitre-Gama.
In order to make them less potent, the Commissioner of
Prisons and the Inspector-General of the Police were strip-
ped of their power by making them Ministers.
Amin disbanded the General Service unit (GSU) because
he felt that its loyality was to Obote; however, he replaced
it with an expanded "Military Intelligence." By June of
1971, there were approximately 1500 political prisoners in
detention in Kampala, "400" of which were members of the
cSU
.
Although Amin promised freedom to operate for politi-
cal parties on February 2, 1971. he "abolished Parliament
and vested full legislative executive and military powers in
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himself, and all local authorities were dissolved." La-
ter the same month while addressing the Uganda Air force he
said that it was his mission to lead Uganda out of a "bad
situation" after which he would "organize and supervise a
general election" to give Uganda a genuine civil democratic
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government. He then declared "we will go hack to the bar-
racks and take orders from any Government that will be demo-
cratically elected by the people of Uganda as a whole."
He said his "mission" would take "less than five years."
On February 20, 1971, Amin took on the title of Presi-
dent while at the same time making himself a full Genral
.
Two days later he lifted the State of Emergency that had ex-
isted under Obote’s Government since 1966. However, four
weeks later, on March 23, 1971, President Amin suspended all
political activity (Suspension of Political Activities Decree
passed 3 days earlier) for two years "as a tempory measure"
to give the Government time to restore public order and
peace in Uganda. Also, all former MPs and local councillors
had to report to the police.
Although the coup itself was virtually bloodless, in
the months that followed there is no doubt that thousands of
soldiers and civilians died throughout the country. The pro-
Kabaka people in Huganda burned many houses and slaughtered
herds of cattle of the pro-Obote people in Huganda. A
pro-Obote unit continued to fight it out at the "military
barracks in Moroto for almost a fortnight;" there effort fail-
ed because Obote did not succeed in getting them reinforce-
ments.
More blood was spilled in the Lango and Acholi districts
than anywhere else. In February and March there were so
many people killed at the Karume Falls bridge over the Wile
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that it became known as the "bridge of blood." "The bridge
continued to be used a.s a place for executioners
.
' m
the Acholi area there were arrests, killings, and peo^e dis-
appearing. (bor example, the younger son of the Minister for
Natural Resources, Wilson Oryema, "disappeared soon after
returning to Uganda from military training in Europe.")'0
Amin’s first task was to get complete control of the
Army. he attempted to achieve this goal by promoting those
men that were "most loyal" to him i.e. one l\CO was promoted
to major. However, it was mainly the lower-ranking officers
who were promoted and not the "professionally- trained middle-
rank officers." These promotions which benefited the West
Nile region and Amin’s own small tribe, the Kakwa, produced
disorder in the army.
Ubote’s own fellow-tribesmen, the bangi
,
were the first
to be thoroughly purged, next came the Acholi who were up-
set about the favoritism that was being given to the soldiers
of the West Nile area. The Langi and the Acholi accounted
for over "60 percent of the original army."
During the first part of the year in 1972, there was
much friction between the Alur and wadi tribes on the one
hand and the Kakwa on the other. There was fighting going
on while Amin was visiting West Germany and Libya. The epi-
sode was straightened out by the Minister of Internal Affairs.
Ernest Obitre-Gama, a member of the Lugbora tribe (largest
of the West Nile tribes of which the Alur and Madi are a
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P-q rt) . The incidents occured at Mutula, and the Uganda-
Tanzania. border, and at Maline in Kampala.
There were a number of mutinies, the first of which o-
ccured in January and involved the Acholi in the Motorized
Regiment. Tribal feeling inside the army is very high as
shown by Major Peter Obama’s appeal for loyality to the Amin
regime; he was an Acholi officer appealing to the mutineers
to accept the new military regime and explaining to the Ach-
oli soldiers that the senior officers of the Lango tribe were
using them in order to regain control in Uganda.
At this time in April, 1972, Amin "launched his cam-
rf 1paign against Israel," partly as a tactic to blame Uganda's
problems on an outside source and partly as a move to win
friends among the Arabs.
There was more trouble, for on dune 9, 1972, Captain
Avudria-Adami, a Lugbara, was killed. This forced the other
Lugbara officers to "close ranks;" there was talk of "re-
venge and later of overthrowing the government. On June 12,
"there were reports of Lugbara units in the army preparing
for battle."
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At this point Amin came back from his visit
to the Sudan on the pleadings of acting President Charles
Obo th-Ofumbi
.
For 36 hours, Amin "addressed troops and officers."
All was calm and he subsquently left to visit Egypt. It
appears that the Lugbara were "deterred" from an attempted
coup by "lack of leadership" and more importantly by "the
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10 percent or so of southern Sudanese ex-Anyana fighters
which have been drafted into the armed forces and who are
personally loyal to Amin.
"
The mutinies continued in July and spread from Mbarara
to Moroto to Jinja in which "Acholi and Lango servicemen
were shot, hacked and clubbed to death by fellow servicemen."^
Also prominent Acholi and Lango citizens in the civil ser-
vice and in public life were called in for questioning by
the Military Police most of whom were beaten and then released.
Some were detained especially those arrested during the coup
and (iSU members; the detention Decree issued on May 11, 1971,
gave power to any commissioned officer to ’suspect' persons;
Military Decree wo. 15 could make their stay indefinite.
To make things worse any member of the armed force could make
an arrest "without" a warrent. Dor a time, the sitution a-
round Mbale was very bad because the army became unruly, mis-
treating important officials like the District Commissioner ;
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furthermore, "civilians used the army to settle old scores."
Dissatisfaction spread also to Karamoja District be-
cause of Amin’s decision to force these people to wear clothes.
There was an outbreak of cholera; the people of Karamoja be-
lieved that the outbreak was the result of President Amin's
disregard for tradition. At a meeting in Mbale, where offi-
cials of the government advocated "wearing clothes, the
crowd became hostile and the army had to open fire before
& f)
making 120 arrests."
64
1 ~t appears that to a certain extant min lost control
of the army mainly because he concentrated power in the
Muslim and iMubian elements of the army and because his pro-
1 si ami c policies alienated the Protestants and Catholics.
He also allegedly escaped two assasination attempts on his
life i.e. the first in November, 1972, and the other just be-
fore Christmas 1972.
The important outcome of the army troubles in 1972, was
a reorganization of the command structure of the armed for-
ces. The position of chief of Defense Staff was done away
with; in its place were the new positions of Army commander,
Air Rorce Commander, and Paratroop Commander. "This meant
in effect that it would be much more difficult for any one
man to be able to coordinate the three service wings for a
an
coup attempt in Amin’s absense." Rrom now on, when Amin
was out of the country, ' opera tional ’ control would rest col-
lectively in the Defense Council.
At this time, during March 1972, Amin also created the
State Research Department which is an intelligence gathering
operation and "appears close to the disbanded GSU" in its
role
.
His next important move was to suspend Lieut. -Col.
0 bi tre-Gama, a Lugbara, as Minister of: Internal ffairs; Amin
himself had taken over the portfolio. Lieut. -Col. Obitre-
Gama was la ter given a new portfolio,- Minister of Power and
Communication; it was probably a move to diminish his pop-
ularity with ordinary Ugandans since he would have the im-
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possible problem of dealing with taxi driver’s strikes end
bus services which were very poor. Also the Ministry of
internal Affairs was brought under the Ministry of Defense;
in the event of unrest the Police would no longer be able
to ect as independent forces.
The relationship between the military side of the
Government which was dominated by President/General Amin and
the Ministers drifted apart rather than together. The Min-
isters "were allowed very little authority" and since they
were all made military cadets, this in effect made them sub-
ject to military discipline. "The potentially effective
civil servants also failed to find a new sense of purpose." J
Amin seemed to take delight in undermining the authority of
his ministers for he told the army to arrest anyone--
"aren if he be a Minister" --who was engaging in subversive
activity. "All statements and policies by his Ministers"
had to be cleared by Amin’s office before they could be
relea sed
.
He disbanded the national Service; although the civil
servants lost political power, it appears that they "regained
most of their economic privileges."
7 by early 1972, the
" nationali zed industries" were changed from a 60 percent
go vernm ent/40 percent private ratio to a. 49 percent/;! per-
cent ratio respectively. (in December, 1972, Amin announ-
ced the nationali ztion of "all tea- estates owned by for-
,
90
eigners and of certain other foreign owned companies.'
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The coup itself, along with the mutinies that have
occured, as well as the expulsion of Asians (,to he discussed
later) have had a disturbing affect on the economy. Invest-
ment had been lagging and the disturbances have produced a
"dislocation of production." Amin’s economic policies have
stressed "increases in military expenditure at the expense
Q "I
of social and economic projects ." 7 Bven more detrimonious
to Uganda, was the absense of structure in the Government.
President Amin made all of the important economic de-
cisions himself. He w^ s pre-occupied with maintaining po-
wer and building support for his regime by constantly tour-
ing in all parts of Uganda, so that he paid less attention
to economic affairs unless they concerned military spending.
Besides, he was a professional soldier and therefore by
training was inclined to action rather than paper work. When
he did take advice it was more than "likely to be on an ad
hoc basis from his military associates than from his qualified
civil servants or Ministers, who seemed afraid to advise him
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in the direction of potentially unpopular measures."
Since Amin abolished Parliament, outlawed political
parties, and took direct control of the local government, he
ruled Uganda by "decree" and "through a military junta."
The latter in the long run is the inherent weakness in the
.'min regime because no stable government can be based on
an army whose soldiers have a current record ot mutiny, ot
killing each other, of intimidating private citizens, and of
forming tribal barriers among themselves.
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However, for now Amin remains in control even though the
army h^s doubled in size since the coup. He is constanly
touring in a 11 parts of Uganda so that he is in contact with
the people i.e. he likes to get involved in dance displays.
He has a curious sense of naivety, as for example, when he
accused the Chinese of aiding the Tanzanians in an effort to
"invade” Uganda and turned around and invited Mao Tse-tung
to a celebration of the first anniversity of his coup.
He seems to take a greater interest in local rather
than national problems i.e. he personally tried to ease the
bitterness between the Muslim (he is one) and the Christian
communities. He is a devout Muslim and through the use of
the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council has set about the task of
uniting the feuding factions of the Muslim community. He has
condemned political interference in religious affairs and
declared that his "Government would respect all religions
93in Uganda. His own role, he said, ’was determined by God.’"
He also has personally attempted to re-unite the stud-
ents at Makerere University in Kampala. To do this he made
himself the Chancellor but he upheld the right of the Govern-
ment given it under the Obote regime to intervene in the mak-
ing of senior staff appointments. in an effort to win over
the support of students he said that "his Government had
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confidence and trust in the students."
in order to deal with the conflicts existing within the
national Union of Students of Uganda and other student groups,
he proposed to send "senior army and police ofuicers to the
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schools to supervise the elections for student representa-
tives. Ostensibly, he said that he was not only doing it
for their support "but that he also wanted them to tell him
where he was going wrong.
One is, therefore, led to the conclusion that Amin
thinks that Uganda should be run as an army is, i.e. there
being a hierarchial structure with good communication be-
tween the officers and the men. For Amin is not only the
President of Uganda, the ueneral of the Army, the uhancellor
of Makerere university, but also the self-proclaimed spokes-
man for the religious community.
Although they supported Amin initially, by the early
part of 1972, the pro-Kabaka and traditional elements among
the baganda. began to realize that their traditional system
of kingship would, not be restored. Amin agreed to their
first demand that the ex-Kabaka, Sir Edward Mutesa, who died
in 1969 in London, be buried in the Kasubi tombs in buganda.
A state of "national hysteria existed among the baganda
"during the five day holiday from March 30, to April 4, in
which an effort was made to link the burial of the ex-Kabaka
to the succession of his son Ronald to the Kabakaship.
Since Amin committed himself to the position that the
four districts would not be reunited as a. single entity, he
announced that it would be for the people of all Uganda to
decide on the issue of the restoration of the Kabakaship.
This was an astute political move since it was clear that the
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people in the other districts of Uganda did not went to re-
store the Baganda to their former privileged position in
Uganda. The other three districts including the former
King of Ankole supported a republican form of government.
The Kabakaship was finished, the kingdoms were not to be re-
introduced. President 'min therefore alienated the two mil-
lion or so Bagandans. Baganda politicians are hopeful that
the power struggles within the army between the Acholi and
the Langi on one side and the West Nilens on the other may
weaken the northern base which the Obote regime secured so
that power would revert to Buganda.
In October, 1971, Amin ordered a census taken of the
Asian community. Then in December, 1971, he cancelled the
"12,000 pending" applications for Ugandan citizenship. The
census he said, made it necessary to have new qualifications.
He accused the Asians of "disloyalty, income tax evasion,
profiteering, and sabotaging the Governments efforts to bring
96Africans into trading." In January, 1972, the Asian com-
munity insisted in a memorandum to Amin that their right of
citizenship was given to them by the Uganda constitution.
Amin’s reaction was that he did not want an "Indian colony"
in Uganda and he suggested that they were plotting with
civil servants. The result of this was that A.sians began to
leave Uganda.
Internal economic conditions d-id not rob President
Amin of his political ambition which was demonstrated by the
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mass expulsion of 70,000 to 80,000 Asians with British pass-
ports, even though they played a. vital role in the Ugandan
retail trade. In August, 1972, he ordered all Asians from
Uganda hy November of 1972; the airlift of the Asians from
Uganda to London began on September 18, 1972. President Amin
said, ''a message from Bod in a dream"^ inspired him to ex-
pel the Asians.
Although President Amin had trouble filling the posi-
tions left vacant by the Asians, he continued to introduce
other drastic measures such as the nationalization of sev-
eral British companies in fecember, 1972. The reason for
the latter is that Amin soon realized that expulsion of the
Asians did not make "the P sian sector of the economy avail-
able for African ownership because finance had come from
British-owned institutions, and foreclosures had passed con-
98trol" from Asian to British hands. Hence, the expulsion
of the British which allowed the government of Uganda to ex-
propriate the businesses for distribution to Africans.
in part, the timing of Amin’s expulsion of the Asians
seems to have a lot to do with the deteriorating relations
with Britian. In early 1972, he was unable to get any military
equipment or aid on a satisfactory basis. Thirty thousand
of the 80 thousand Asians had British passports so Britian
was obliged to accept them.
Also at this time Amin sent a- delegation to the Soviet
99 .
union "possibly to obtain military aid." ' By this time
he apparently had given up on Britian and Israel and turn-
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ed to the Soviets and the Arabs for aid.
Although the "expulsion" of the Asians was in general
very unpopular on the international scene, at home and in
Africa Amin became somewhat of a hero. in Uganda, it assured
him of popular support because in theory there was going to
be more money and jobs for the African population. In
Africa, he had done what other leaders wanted to do but did
not.
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CHAPTER VI II
POLITICS AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Shortly after the coup, Amin went to Israel, France,
and Britian in sea.rch of military equipment and aid.
The Israeli denied his request in July, 1971 for more
military advisors; they were already training air force pi-
lots at Entebbe and had established a paratroop training
program at Kisoro.
All he recieved from the Europeans was a British agree-
ment to help build a military Academy and a negotiation for
small arms by the French along with a consideration to help
Uganda build its second university.
After accusing the Chinese of aiding Tanzania in an ef-
fort to "invade Uganda, Amin recieved the Chinese Charge'
d’ Affaires in September, 1971, to request a loan; he, Amin,
spoke of strenghtening "the good relationship that has ex-
#
isted between Uganda and China. " 10°
Amin had difficulty getting his regime recognized by
the other African states; Britian, followed by the other
European states "as well as the Soviet bloc, established nor-
mal relations" 101 shortly after the coup. (Prince Minister
Heath of Britian was no doubt enthusiastic about Amin’s
coup since Obote, at the Singapore Commonwealth Conference,
had opposed the sale of arms by Britian to South Africa.)
The Council of ministers of the Organization of African
Unity refused, however, to grant the "automatic recognition
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that wps due to a member state. There were a couple of
rep sons for this. First, immediately after the coup, Amin
announced that he was not opposed to the British sale of
arms to South Africa which aroused bitterness among those
states who opposed such a venture. To those states who oppo-
sed the latter, it would help the white minority control the
black majority. To appease the states concerned, President
Amin declared that South Africa was "a threat to the se-
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curity of the whole of Africa." He added that the only
solution to South / frica was a "military one" and he there-
fore condemned the sale of British arms to South Africa on
March 15, 1971. He also called upon the British to use force
to bring down the white controlled Government of Kodesia and
pledged Uganda's support to the freedom movements within the
OAU. In December, 1971, he proposed to the OAU Defense
Commission that Uganda be used to train OAU forces in order
to liberate the white ruled-states of southern Africa.
Second, his close association with the "Israeli military
advisors" tended to alienate the Arab States. The first Arab
state to oppose the Amin regime was Somalia, on January 30,
1971; a Somali representative declared, "we condemn the coup
and its leaders." 10 ^ Uganda was also accused of represent-
ing "foreign capi talist-imperialists interests." His policy
at this time of nonalignment in the Middle Fast did little
to help his regime gain recognition by the Arab states.
in an effort to repair his regime's relations with the
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Arabs, he introduced the Arabic language on "Radio Uganda"
and accepted an invitation to visit Saudi Arabia. He also
set himsel l to the task o f easing the tension between the
Sudan and Uganda. There had been a long standing dispute
between the Sudanese Government and Uganda. The Sudanese
Government has accused Uga.nda of aiding southern Sudanese reb-
els in their attacks into the Sudan. On taking power, Amin
protested that Sudanese troops had bombed the A choli area.
(at this time Obote had active support in this district) It
was also alleged that "500 Langi" were being trained in the
Sudan for gueirllla warfare against Uganda. However, by July,
1971, Amin changed his tactics toward the Sudan- -the result
was that General Numeiry agreed to establish a Uganda embas-
sy in Khartoum.
By mid-June, 1971, a majority of the African States
"were willing to accept-if not yet to recognize-Amin.
It is very difficult to assess the foreign policy of
Amin’s regime at this point, since it appears to be abiguous
and rather fickle. for example, whereas in March, 1971, he
condemned South Africa, on September 28, 1971, President Amin
announced that he was sending a ten man delegation to South
105
Africa "to study the problems of the African people."
He insisted on the freedom of the delegation to meet people
in all parts of the country but said he would not go himself.
However, on October 1, 1971, Prime Minister Mr. vorster of
South Africa refused to accept the fact-finding delegation
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and instead invited President Amin or members of his Gov-
ernment to pay a visit. To this Amin replied that as the
Head of State, he would be allowed to meet only those peo-
ple who had been told what to say. On December 23, 1971,
the Ugandan Foreign Minister said that his country "complete-
ly and unequivocally" opposed any dialogue with South Africa.
As regards the Sudan, by December, 1971, Amin 'claimed’
that fierce fighting had been going on between the Sudanese
troops and the southern Sudanese rebels inside Uganda. Amin
had allowed Sudanese refugees to enter Uganda as long as
they "surrendered their weapons;" he declared that Uganda
would not let its soil be used as a base for attacking its
neighbors. nevertheless, by the end of the year, the govern-
ment of Amin expelled the Sudanese Ambassador. The two
countries seemed to be right back to where they once were.
Relations between members of the East African community
which consist of Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania became strained
after Amin's coup especially with Tanzania. Many of Obote's
supporters fled not only to the Sudan, but to Kenya and
Tanzania as well.
Shortly after the coup, hundreds of officers and men
loyal to Obote, fled to Kenya, and Tanzania; by April their
number rose to about a thousand. The large majority of
them were Langi from Obote's own area but they were soon
joined by Acholi and others, it's. their presense that ex-
plains Amin's threa.ts to "invade" Tanzania. Tanzania, had
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become a dangerous threat to Amin because Nyerere had allow-
ed Obote into his counry, and because the thousand or so
Obote supporters who fled to Tanzania were now at Obote'
s
disposal. In this circumstance, Amin had reason to expect
that Nyerere would aid Obote in a counter-coup. At the same
time, Amin had to deal with the internal disorders and mutin-
ies throughout Uganda in the months following his coup.
Although Amin may have been justified in assuming that
an invasion was imminent, either from the Sudan or Kenya, but
especially from Tanzania, "no invasion" came. Tanzania was
nevertheless accused of carrying "out subversive and hostile
10 b
activities against the Government and people of Uganda."
When fighting broke out at the barracks of Ma.gamaga, near
Jinja, Amin announced that the "guerrillas" had claimed "1,000"
Uganda lives. He further stated that in the fighting at
Jinja and Moroto the guerrillas "had been assisted by Tanzan-
ians and Mozambique freedom fighters as well as by there
. . ,
.
„107Chinese advisors. . ."
in mid-August, 1971, nyerere accused the Government of
Amin sending tanks and troops into Tanzania and announced that
"fighting was continuing." On the same day Amin announced
that fighting between Ugandan troops and "Chinese led Tan-
zania. forces" "had flared up."
From the very beginning, Nyerere refused to accept the
Amin Government as a legitimate one (another cause of the bit-
terness between Nyerere and Amin) . he said that he "would
'll
never agree to sit with killers like Amin in the Authority
of the bast African Community.
On July 7, 1971, the border between the two countries
was closed. As an afterthought, it seems that Amin used the
idea of a real or imagined infiltration in the Ugandan army
barracks, as a means of creating a sense of national unity.
Amin's political style is one of hard aggressive state-
ments which are off-set by conciliatory talks. While this
may give him support in Uganda, it is a policy which made di-
plomacy difficult in the bast African community. For example,
Kenya was concerned about having a tough, aggresive military
regime so close to its own territory while experiencing its
own political problems. The first sign of Kenyan recognition
of the Amin regime did not come until Arop Moi, made an appear-
ance at the Kabaka's funeral.
The bitterness between wyerere and Amin continued in 1972.
"Dr. Nyerere, President of Tanzania, dismissed as 'nonsense'
reports that his country was about to invade"'*" 0 ^ Uganda.
Amin claimed "1,000 Tanzanian troops" invaded Mutukula
,
a town on Uganda’s south-west border with Tanzania.. However,
Tanzania declared that the fighting on September 17, 1972,
was between Amin's troops and dissidents of a Ugandan "People's
Army.
"
The fighting went on for days. Then on September 19,
1972, a Uganda "military spokesman announced that the invasion
force" from Tanzania "had been 'completely'" wiped out.
Because the police were mistrusted, "scores of them were
killed and beaten up after the September, 1972, invasion"^ 0
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of Obote’ s People’s Army from Tanzania.
The attack on September 17, 1972, under Uol. David Oyike
Ojok with about 1,000 men failed partly because there was
no mutiny as apparently the Obote forces hoped there would
be one. Plso at this time, Amin was enjoying a lot of popu-
larity because of the expulsion of the Asians.
The outcome of Obote’ s failure was the ’’Mogadishu agree-
ment" which forbade the training of an army in Tanzania to
attack Uganda.
Then on November 4, 1973, President Kenyatta announced
that as a result of a meeting between President Amin and
President Nyerere "discrepancies" had been done away with.
(''min had delivered a message from President Sadat of Egypt
to the leaders of Tanzania, Zambia, and Zaine allegedly on
the problems in the Middle East.
b'or the moment at least, it appears that Uganda and Tan-
zania, or more precisely, their leaders, are able to live
with each other.
After the 1967 war, 1 sraeli-U gandan relations began to
cool as Obote’ s foreign policy shifted toward support for
Egypt’s cause. The morning after Amin's coup there were many
Ugandan air force planes in the sky. "it is possible that
some of these planes were piloted by Israelis since the Ugan-
dan air force had few trained pilots." it coulo imply
approval of the coup and/or "some deeper involvement." Is-
rael welcomed Amin's coup and promptly gave him military and
79
economic assistance. Amin’s first foreign visit was to Is-
rael
.
However, partly because he wanted the support and recog-
nition of the Arab states and pertly because the Israeli did
not supply him with the aid he wanted, on March 29, 1972, at
a "security conference" of the armed forces Amin ordered the
Israeli Embassy in Kampala closed and asked its diplomats
to leave Uganda within ten days as a result of alleged sub-
version activity. Shortly thereafter, on April 29, 1972,
Amin said that "Libya would train Uganda Air Force pilots
and Army personnel, and would also build and equip two 100
111bed hospitals in Uganda."
The expulsion of Israelis personnel from Uganda in April,
1972, probably influenced Mali and iMiger which also broke off
diplomatic relations with Israel. The expulsion of the Is-
raeli had its elements of self-interest i.e. military equip-
ment and aid. There is also the common denominator of an
"increasing sense of identity, particularly in those states
with large Muslim population, with the Arab cause in the mid-
1
1
2die East."
m the fall of 1972, after the massacre of Israeli Ath-
letes at the Olympic Games, Amin sent a telegram to the UJM
Secretary-General Dr. Waldheim as well as to Mrs. Golda Mier
of Israel and Yasa Arafat of the Falistinian movement. In
the telegram he said that, "Germany is the right place where,
when Hitler was Prime Minister and supreme commander, he
burned over six million Jews. This was because Hitler and
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all the German people know that the Israelis are not people
who are working in the interest of the people of the world
and that is why he burned the Israelis alive with gas in the
soil of Germany."
Amin has been given the title the world's "biggest pol-
itical clown" for making such statements as "the Jews should
be wiped out and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is
114planning an invasion of Uganda."
He continues to use his simple and individualistic style
of government in which he refuses to observe conventional in-
ter-governmental procedures. For example, President Amin
sent a telegram to the U.S. on Independence Day 1973, in
which he caused very much "offense by wishing President Nixon
1
1
5
’a speedy recovery from Watergate’ and urged" the U.S.
Government to refrain from meddling in the affairs of other
countri es
.
To illustrate the point further, at present Britian is
suffering her worst economic crisis since World War il so
Amin on December 30, 1973, started his "Save Britian Fund."
He said that the purpose of the fund was to "save and assist
our former colonial masters from economic catastrophe." Then
on January 22, Amin asked P.M. Heath (the former) to send a
plane to pick up the "supplies of wheat and vegetables do-
nated to 'Save Britian'." Needless to say, P.M. ^eath
could hardly have been pleased.
On October 31, 1973, Radio Uganda alleged "that Britian,
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the U.S. and Israel were planning a parachute invasion of
the country.” 1 16 It is also alleged that Amin ’’threatened
to imprison all the Americans including diplomats if the
U.S. became involved in the "October Middle East War" of 1973.
The result was that the u.S. closed its Embassy.
For his anti-Israeli policies Amin has recieved politi-
cal support and financial aid from the Soviets and the Arabs.
on November 10, 1973, the Soviet union sold Uganda "58"
tanks giving Uganda the "most powerful army in East Africa."
From November 14-18, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia was
in Uganda. ne made mention of a loan to Uganda and praised
Amin for his "’brave and courageous support' for the Arab
1 1
7
world" and assured him that all Arabs were with him in the
fight against imperialism and Zionism.
Thirty Egyptian doctors were sent to Uganda and on No-
vember 20, a new Libyan Arab-Uganda Lank for Foreign Trade
and Development was opened; the Libyan Oovernment holds 51
percent interest. Uganda then "recieved a gift of 8 fighter
bombers from a 'friendly country’ according to President
Amin." The friendly country was thought to be Libya.
The Arab member states of the OAU had been soliciting
African support’ in the ^rab-Israeli conflict for some time.
Algerian Foreign Minister M. Bouteflika congratulated Ugan-
da and other countries that supported Egypt. The Arab mem-
bers of the UAU had a "resolution passed which called on
1 1
9
member states to take political and economic me. sures
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UHAPTER IX
POLITICS OF AMIN: 1973-74
Amin’s policies have recieved much support in Africa:
his goal o r an all-block Uganda, his action against Zionism
and neocolonali st control of the Uganda economy through for-
eign control, his apparent eagerness to mobilize his army a-
gainst the minority white regimes to the south, all have
helped to give support within the African community. At
home, the expulsion of the Asians (.which helped to give Ugan-
dans their chance in economic life) has gained him much sup-
port, especially in those areas where people have not ex-
perienced direct "military brutality."
The introduction of Amin’s regime saw two basic changes
in the politics of Uganda. first, there has been a shift in
the balance of power in that the Kakwa (.Amin’s tribe), the
Lugb^ra, and the Madi (.to a lesser extent) have replaced the
Langi and the Acholi ethnic alliance of Obote's regime by
their dominance in the army. Second, "the army has become
the means of power" as well as the chief source of patron-
age by virtue of its control of the government. Neither of
the latter represents a radical change in Ugandan politics
since Uganda has a history of tribal power struggles and the
army has been a key fa.ctor in Ugandan politics since Febru-
ary, 1966. The army, however, has become "the major factor"
since Amin’s take-over.
Although he is at times difficult to understand, "Amin
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has in many ways conformed to the system he inherited." 121
bor example, as did ubote, he "has based his power" mainly
on "his own tribe" while at the same time attracting mem-
bers o t other tribes with the promise of o ffice and/or wealth.
He has managed to stay in power by the use of patronage,
the threat of, or the use of force; for instance, he "pur-
ged at least 50 officers from the army following the bloody
weakened clash between rival tribal military uni i s in Kam-
122pala," on March 24, 1974. There was an attempted coup
by .brigadier uharles Arube, former Army chief of staff who
had recently returned from a military course in the Soviet
Union. There had apparently been several months of fear and
unrest among the 2,000 or so troops of the Lugbara tribe in
the north. The unrest intensified when the former Ugandan
foreign Minister, Lieutnant-Uolonel Michael Ondonga, a Lug-
bara, was found floating in the wile.
it is difficult to say if it was an actual coup or an
effort by 'min to eliminate opposition. Amin’s decision
"to take personal charge of the Defense ministry in order to
reorganize the army" is probably indicative of the latter.
In a message on Radio Uganda, Amin told his soldiers
that if they weren’t happy with hirn, "they should kill him
or ask him to resign, rather than make the peole of Uganda
123
run about during the night."
Unlike ubote, Amin has not resorted to euphemisms to
describe his acts as Head-of-State nor does he worry about
constitutional issues since he rules by decree. Although
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"he is no revolutionary," he has managed to stretch the
Ugandan political system to its limits. It seems that Amin
wants to exploit rather than overthrow the existing system.
The politics of Uganda have been relatively unstable
because the goals of national unity, political stability, mod-
ernization and economic development have not had the insti-
tutional background to be implemented. Uganda was further
burdened in that Obote was not a charismatic leader nor was
he close to the "commaon man" as Amin appears to be; Ugan-
da also h' s the problem of ethnic diversity and hostility as
well as the assumption that the function of government is to
benefit the rulers. "The winner- take-all philosophy was
as much a part of inter- tribal affairs as it was of intra-
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tribal politics." To be in on the government meant
access to power, wealth, and a guarantee of personal inter-
grity; to be outside meant to be loser. Tribal alliance
grew in importance as competion for office and jobs became
Ugnada’s rising industry.
On taking power, Amin set himself to the task of crea-
ting a new balance of power. It consisted of the Kakwas,
the Lug'bara, and the lvla.di ; the soldiers i rom these tribes
have come to dominate the army "along with several thousand
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Nubian, Southern Sudanese, and Congolese mercenaries."
The mercenary soldiers along with the Kakwas have become the
backbone of Amin’s balance of power; they have virtually
been given a free hand in removing the Langi and Acholi
The Nubian are the descendants of blackfrom the army.
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Muslim Sudanese who settled throughout East Africa after
service in colonial armies; they have come from as far as
Nairobi to join the Ugandan army. The Southern Sudanese
"are mainly Christians" who "have come from refugee camps
and re-settled schemes set up in Uganda during the civil war
in the Sudan." ^ It has been "alleged" that the Congolese
are the remants of th Simba rebels from the mulelist re-
bellion in Zaire (the Congo) in the early 1960’s.
It would be an error though to assume that all who were
not a part of the new balance of power would not have access
to governmen positions i.e. William Oryema, the head of the
police and a pro-Obote man who was involved in the latter's
pirns to remove Amin, became became a Cabinet minister for
Amin. There were two reasons for his appointment: he kept
the police out of the way during the coup and being an
Acholi, he was indispensable to Amin's goal of separating
the Acholi and Langi . it becomes clear then that Amin is a
practical man set on strengthening his position and anyone
who can augment that position becomes useful.
For one thing, Muslims are now in the establishment.
This has brought benefits to the Muslim community: they have
been given "valuable" land in Kampala; among the rank and
file and the officer corps in the army, there is a large con-
tingent of Muslims; "Muslim traders are doing proportion-
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ately better in the take-over of Asian businesses."
They have been further aided by the fact that on March 4,
1973, Amin "ordered all businesses except for banks on six
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of Kampala s main streets must be run and managed by Axri —
,
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cans s; also Radio Uganda announced that "no other na-
tional would be allowed to run businesses."
Amin has begun to identify himself with militant Islam
in Worth and Saharan Africa.
Col. Qathafi of Libya, the propagandist of Arab ra-
dicalism and hater of communism was the lever in Amin's ex-
pulsion of the Israeli. Ostensibly, Amin said he was respon-
ding to Uol. Qathafi ' s appeal for strong Muslim ties in the
African states in an effort to increase awareness of the Arab
cause against Israeli, at the time being brought to world
attention by the "Black September" guerrilla init.
It seems more likely that, because Israeli was at the
time "unable and unwilling" to meet Amin's financial demands,
he turned to his oil-rich fellow-Muslim in Libya. Uganda
was promised an immediate 1 million pounds; with 30 million
to follow. This no doubt was a help to Amin since the Ugan-
dan economy was suffering from "finincial and security
strains.
"
The new policy of Amin, as well as the African states
which followed in denouncing Israel, appears to be a con-
sequence of the fact that the Western world is facing a ser-
ies of monetary crisis. The Arab states, especially Libya
and Saudi Arabia, have plenty of oil-rnade-idle-money to
invest.
It also appears now that Amin has set himself to the
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task of inhancing the power of the Ugandan Balck Muslims at
the expense of the Christians. The latter is not an official
pronouncement nevertheless, the Government's relations with
Christian churches, and especially the Roman Catholic sect,
deteriorated i.e. June 3, was made "a. public holiday to com-
morate the burning of Ugandan martyrs (Christian)
Amin has accused the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Kam-
pala, the Most Rev. Emmanuel iMsubuga of "connections with
purported Israeli and South African plots against" 1 ^0 Uganda.
President Amin, on January 29, 1973, declared, "Any re-
ligious leader who brings confusion will be dealt with by a
1 31
military tribunal." however, he denounced reports of re-
ligious disputes in Uganda as "British imperialists" pro-
paganda.
Then on JuneS, 1973 the capital Uganda Government "ban-
ned 12 different religious sects" of which two worthy Jehovah
Witnesses an the Society of Eriends, a Quaker group. it
was added that the Anglican, Catholic, and Islam faiths would
continue to be supported but that "harboured spies or sub-
1 32
versive elements" ' would not be tolerated.
in a move to Africanize the churches (November, 1973)
Amin said that the imperialists might get into Uganda by
religion again so "on iMovember 30, he ordered 58 Christian
missionaries to leave" Uganda, because they entered the
country illegally and were found in "strategic places".
Amin has officially denied any policy of harassment to
Christians. However, of significance to the Christian corn-
89
munity was the fact that the hody of the Rev. Clement
Kiggunda, an editor of a Roman Catholic newspaper, was
found dead in a burnt out car.
From the preceeding, it therefore seems that Amin came
to the conclusion that the "essence of exploitation for
Africa was not capitalism but racial stratification." 154
'1'his would in part explain the mass expulsion of the Asian
community, the ouster of the British, and the Africanization
of the churches.
The point appears to be confirmed by the following:
since a p^rt of his own tribe, the Kakwa, live in the Sudan,
it is not surprising that he sympathized and aided the South-
ern Sudanese Christian and animists) fighters against their
Arab-Muslim northern brethren.
Furthermore, this friendship with the Israelis was re-
lated to common connections with the Southern Sudanese fight-
er i.e. the Israeli were providng military aid to the latter
for the obvious reason to check the Arabs in the nort of the
Sudan.
Another significant element introduced by Amin is the
declining influence of bureaucracy. With careful scrutiny,
it is clear that the civilian ministers are mere cyphers.
Since they are members of the army and therefore are under
Amin’s control, they have been virtually rendered impotent.
Also "the rest of the civil service has not been guiding or
forming policy so much as trying to make presidential decrees
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workable." 13
0
in February, 1973, Amin ordered his Ministers
to take a month’s leave. It is likely that "Amin was using
the period during which ministers were on lesve to form a
new Government of people he could trust and who had firmer
backing within the army." 13 ^ it appears that Amin resents
the professionals.
The outstanding element of Amin's regime is that what
were once unspoken assumptions are now very clear for all to
see and act on. Government benefits those who are in power
which at present consist of the armed forces, Amin’s fellow
tribesmen and black Uganda Muslims. The goal then is to
enrich this new ruling group at the expense of the outsiders.
This does not represent a new set of ground rules in
Amin's regime; on the contrary, these rules were inherited
from Obote’s regime but under Amin they have become more ex-
plicit. The ground rules then helped to explain the rapid
promotion of hakwa, Lugbara, and Sudanese soldiers to the
ranks of majors and lieutenant colonels, the large amount of
money spent on "military equipment and recruitment to pro-
1 37duce an army of nearly 20,000," the massacres of Acholi
and Langi troops as well as GSU and Special Force men, and
"the ’disappearance’ of prominent Ugandans."
Public execution and deaths focused world attention on
Uganda in early 1973. A military tribunal found twelve men
guilty of "association with guerillas or robbery" and order-
ed them to be executed in their home districts for everyone
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to see.
There was also a list of "missing" persons of which the
International Commission of Jurists attacked as "lawlessness";
the Director and the Regional Supplies Officer of East
African Railways were reported "missing" thus causing many
employees to flee to Kenya. There is a list of 85 "missing"
men over a period of two years.
An example of the reign of terror and senselessness
that exists in Uganda is exemplified hy the following: "A
Uganda husband and wife were reported to been sentenced to
five years imprisonment for putting down their pet cat: it
-1 7 J
was called Amin."
In a move to show that his government was going in a
new direction, Amin in September, 1973, took away the "army’s
right to make arrests and directed that only the police with
159
a warrent or military police in uniform could make arrests."
in an effort to maintain control of the Army and by
that the government, Amin announced a change in the structure
of Uganda’s government. Henceforward, Uganda would have
"ten provinces", (headquarters in parentheses): Nile (Aua)
;
Northern (Gula); Karamoja (Movoto) ; Eastern (Whale) ; Busoga
(Jinja); North Buganda (Bombo) ; South Buganda (Masoka)
;
Western (Fort Portal); Southern (Mbarara) ; and Kampala Pro-
vince which will cover Kampala and Entebbe districts." The
Provincial Governors were to be responsible to the Minister
of Provincial Administration which wa.s headed by Colonel
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moses Ali, who was himself responsible to Amin.
The government of Uganda would be run by a State Su-
preme Council which would consist of the President (Amin),
the Prime Minister or Vice-President who would be assigned
"ministerial duties", the commanders of the Army, Air .force
and Navy, the Chief of Staff and the Ministers of defense
and Public Administration. (Prior to this, the key bodies
in Uganda were the defense Council, the State Research de-
partment, the Public Safety unit, and the Special Branch;
their names alone suggest a state of "revolutionary" emergen-
cy. )
The people were to be represented by the National For-
um, which wa s a "limited return to representative government,
although it may meet only four times a year." 1 ^ The Ration-
al Forum will include Amin, his ministers, a representative
from each county, and a municipal representative from Kam-
pala, Jinja, Mbale, and Mo ska. It is obvious, however,
that power w^s to remain in the hands of 'min and the mili-
tary.
It was also announced that Swahili would become the na-
tional language although English would remain the official
language in the mean time. Swahili is used by both the ar-
my and the police. Amin wanted to adopt a native language;
he suggested Luganda which is spoken by 4 million of Ugan-
da's population of about 10 million; However, Luganda is
the language of Luganda and many feared that this might
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help "to give “them back their superiorly
. /'min must have
known this; he probably did it to gain political support
end favor from the baganda.
Amin’s government is based on the postulate; he who wins
also takes. in the hands of certain elements within the
ermy, this has unfortunately led to the elimination to the
losers. however, it should be pointed out that Amin has ex-
perienced more substantial threats to his regime than did
Obote i.e. the "continued activity of guerrillas" and the
recurring troubles in the army.
it is the contention of this paper then that Amin inher-
ited the spoils system along with its fierce competition for
office and its ensuing benefits from Obote, but that he has
extended the system to its limits. Under Amin, the business
of government continues but it follows end does not precede
the business of the spoils.
Amin has set a dangerous precedent which may cause his
fall from power. under his rule, force and violence have
become the "very foundation" of Uganda’s politics.
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CONCLUSION
Briefly "then, in "the con irontation wi"th buganda^ in
1966 it was not the Sandhurst- trained officers but the dis-
obedience of the NCO 1 s that ensued Obote 's survival. This
disobedience Obote honored annually by a special dinner.
between 1966-71, Obote was careful to fragment the U-
gandan armed forces by attracting foreign military assis-
tance from a diversity of donors, and by building up another
battalion here, another police unit there. A mistake that
"southern” politicians made before 1966 had been to neglect
the role of the police as a. support group for Obote t,it
was the police, not the army, that arrested the five "south-
ern" Cabinet ministers in February, 1966). This chance mis-
take Obote, now, transformed into a major principle of poli-
cy. The Special Force was built as a para-military unit to
take over for the army in emergencies such as the one that
followed the. abortive attempt upon ubote’s life in December,
1969. A police air-wing w? s also created to keep an eye on
the air force. However, in January, 1971, it became clear
that it was ubote who had miscalculated; Amin's seizure of
power was facilitated by a deeply divided army.
After seizing power, Amin's soldiers issued a list of
grievances against the Obote regime. In them, they repeat-
edly denounced the rich getting richer, economic policies
leading to unemployment, local security suffering excess-
ively from attacks by bakondo robbers, and Obote 's national
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service proposals leading not so much to the erection of a
counter-vailing force to the army as to the removal o f fur-
ther hinderance to armed rohbery. Here are clear signs of
urban populism. Lhe Sandhurst— trained officer corp was un-
successful. Amin's seizure of power brought into the pol-
itical culture the lov/er-income urban groups. It is from
these people that Amin has recieved much support, especially
when he ousted the Asians.
In 1972, the most vociferous opposition to the expul-
sion of the Asians came from African intellectuals. Only
the urban-related groups most likely to profit from the ex-
pulsion can positively be said to have supported it. If
there is any common element in Amin’s present support group,
it would appear to be an urban-related one.
Another crucial aspect of the Amin government is the
"progressive militarization" of the political scene. It
seems that precisely because the "civilian bureaucracy was
so much stronger in Uganda for various historical reasons,
Uganda soldiers had to smash their way through it before
they could achieve the power that they desired. The best
comparison seems to be with the "colonels Greece".
But whatever comparisons are made with civil-military
relations elsewhere, Uganda, little more than three years
after Amin's coup, seems strikingly different from its con-
dition upon his initial assumption of power. Then there
was little to distinguish it from the previous regime, ex-
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cept, at le- st initially, a more amenable policy towards
an<^ greater emphasis upon the importance of tribal
questions. There was no need for a policy of terror. In
immedia te aitermath o f Obote's overthrow, the repeal of
the emergency regulations created popular euphoria, while at
the same time the opportunity for office proved a tempting-
bait ror alternative leadership groups.
how all is changed: terror against the intelligentia
appears to be at least in part a conscious strategy rein-
forcing Amin's commitment to the lower urban stratum in U-
ganda drom which so many of his foremost supporters seem to
be drawn.
African armies, in contrast to European armies, do not
have long traditions. Because of this, many of the African
armies are very small and poorly disciplined but they do
have organization and the force of arms. This accounts for
the apparent ease with which African military coups suceed.
Many African leaders are obsessed with the idea of ob-
taining status and prestige which is reflected in the fact
that where military rulers have taken over there has been
an inevitable build-up of the armed forces despite more press-
ing economic and social needs. Large armies in many Afri-
can countries are associated with national prestige; so
President Amin is spending large amounts of money to build-
up his countries military might.
invariably military leaders pledge a return to civilian
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government, tut usually they only pay lip-service to this
pledge. The excuse they use is that they inherited a cha-
otic situation and that it h^s to be rectified first.
It is usually the case that military governments are
as dictatorial or even more so than the regimes they re-
placed .
Military regimes create a false sense of unity and se-
curity. The African countries are too segmented ethnically
and loyalities are too parochial for anyone to think he can
bring about true national unity in a short while.
in many cases the military government resembles its
predecessor or in some cases it is worse. The military gov-
ernment of Amin is different from the civil government of
Obote only in degree. Amin is stretching the system to its
limits whereas ubote was more cautious.
The oldest soldier-politician administration in Africa
is that of Houari uoumedienne in Algeria, on May 19, 1965.
It would therefore be inappropriate to draw any conclusions
ps to the longevity of the military regime of Amin. How-
ever, to maintain an efficiently run government, the military
regime must depend to a certain extent on the bureaucratic
and organizational skill of the civil service. The age of
specialization h°s reached Africa; there will therefore come
a time when armed coercion alone will not be enough to stay
in power.
Without the hinderance of democratic processes, the mil-
98
itary regime has the advantage that its decisions will be
carried out quickly. The conclusion to be drawn from this
is that unrestricted authority possibly remains as a pre-
requisite for effective administration at this time in Ugan-
da’s as well as Africa’s political history.
One of the methods used by a military leader to remain
in control is to take off his military uniform for the civil-
ian presidential one. The military coup d'etat may prove
to be a tempory antidote to Africa's economic and political
instability.
Finally this p- per did not attempt to provide answers
for any of the problems facing Uganda today. Those a.nswers
will only come in time through error, turmoil, and sweat.
This paper did at least bring the problems into focus.
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